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Liberty Is Not Loco-motion: Obergefell and the
Originalists' Due Process Fallacy
ANDREW T. BODOH*
ABSTRACT

"

Jn an effort to discredit substantive due process, originalists often
misinterpret the federal Due Process Clauses. Justice Clarence Thomas's
Obergefell v. Hodges dissent illustrates this. In this dissent, Justice
Thomas cites Blackstone's Commentaries to argue that Due Process
"liberty" is merely freedom from physical restraint, what Blackstone
describesas the power of "loco-motion.
This Article challenges Justice Thomas's narrow view of Due Process
liberty from Obergefell v. Hodges on its own terms. It distills from the
dissent and its sources five assumptions or premises supporting Justice
Thomas's view, and it confronts each of these with contrary evidence from
the historical record, especially the 1776 to 1789 American state "law of
the land" clauses. Along the way, this Article establishes that Due Process
"life, liberty, or property" is best understood as a single term of art
describing all interests to be protected by the state under a Lockean social
contract. The Article also illustrates the practical effect of this competing
view by examining the pre-FourteenthAmendment "law of the land" case
lawfrom North Carolina.
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As used in the Due Process Clauses, "liberty" most likely refers to "the
power of loco-motion, of changing situation, or removing one's person to
whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct; without imprisonment
or restraint, unless by due course of law." That definition is drawn from
the historical roots of the Clauses and is consistent with our Constitution's
text and structure.

- Justice Clarence Thomas

Obergefell v. Hodges dissent
INTRODUCTION

In the last several years, United States Supreme Court Justice
Clarence Thomas and others ascribing to originalism jurisprudence have
proffered an excessively narrow view of "liberty" in the federal Due
Process Clauses. This view equates Due Process liberty with Sir William
Blackstone's definition of "personal liberty" in the first volume of his
Commentaries on the Law of England, originally published in 1765.2
1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2632 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF

ENGLAND 134 (4th ed. 1770)). But cf id at 2634-35 (describing, in the alternative, the
Lockean view of liberty), and Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225,
1245 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing liberty as freedom from arbitrary
government action).
2. Eg, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2632 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2478-79 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice
Thomas); Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2133 (2015) (plurality opinion) (joined by Justice
Thomas); Discussion: Originalism and Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, in
ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 135, 139 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007)
(quoting John Harrison, who said, "I think the reference to liberty in the Due Process Clause
refers to natural liberty. That is to say to not being physically confined."); see also Turner
v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 450-55 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (denying a right to counsel
exists under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause for civil contempt proceedings
involving incarceration); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 589 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("[I]t is possible that the Due Process Clause requires only 'that our Government
must proceed according to the "law of the land"-that is, according to written constitutional
and statutory provisions."' (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 382 (1970) (Black, J.,
dissenting))).
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Blackstone defined "personal liberty" essentially as the absence of physical
restraint-the ability to act on one's "power of loco-motion." 3 Justice
Thomas's dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges, in particular, presents the
originalists' Due Process fallacy.4
Originalism is supposed to be rooted in history, so one may justly
critique originalists for engaging in faulty historical interpretation. The
originalists' Due Process fallacy, equating Due Process liberty exclusively
to freedom from physical restraint, and specifically Justice Thomas's
presentation of this argument in his Obergefell dissent, misinterprets
history. Perhaps Justice Thomas's final conclusion in Obergefell is validthis Article simply does not engage in that analysis. Instead, this Article
criticizes, based on the historical record, Justice Thomas and his
compatriots' views that "liberty" in the federal Due Process Clauses means
merely the absence of physical restraint.
For a more targeted criticism, this Article does not dispute Justice
Thomas's method of interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause through the lens of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
Legal scholars have reasonably suggested the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause has a distinct "original meaning" that may even alter the
legal meaning of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.' This Article
does not follow this approach. Rather, this Article studies the meaning of
due process clauses and their prototypes (i.e., "law of the land" clauses)
from the American Revolution to the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as Justice Thomas does in this portion of his Obergefell
dissent.6
Part I of this Article presents Justice Thomas's view from Obergefell
that Due Process liberty is the absence of physical restraint. From this
dissent and its sources, this Article identifies five arguments and
assumptions supporting Justice Thomas's narrow view of Due Process
liberty. The Article then critiques each in turn, building in stages a
competing view of the meaning of the constitutional norm. Specifically,
this Article argues the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause was, and in
many respects remains, a repository of unformulated or imperfectly
3. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1. While freedom from physical restraint certainly "lies
'at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause,"' the originalists' Due
Process fallacy is the reduction of Due Process liberty to this core freedom from physical
restraint. Rogers, 564 U.S. at 445 (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
4. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2632-34 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But see id. at 263435 (offering an alternative, broader view of liberty).
5. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 65, 86
(Antonin Scalia ed., 1997).
6. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2633 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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formulated principles regulating government action in the interests of
preserving liberty, broadly understood as freedom from unreasonable or
arbitrary government action.
In developing this argument, Part II considers the erroneous assertion
that late eighteenth-century American law of the land and due process
clauses were all substantially identical. Part Ell argues "liberty" in these
clauses is not a distinctly definable term, as Justice Thomas presumes in
Obergefell, but rather "life, liberty, or property" is a single term of art. Part
IV argues Due Process "liberty" is not Blackstonean "personal liberty"i.e., freedom from restraint-but rather "life, liberty, or property" refers
collectively to a broader Lockean notion of liberty as the opposite of
arbitrary government. Part V challenges textual arguments based on the
Constitution advanced by Justice Thomas and his Obergefell sources. Part
VI challenges Justice Thomas's view that due process liberty was
uniformly interpreted as freedom from physical restraint in pre-Fourteenth
In addition to critiquing Justice Thomas's
Amendment case law.
arguments and those of his sources, Part VI also reviews North Carolina
case law of the period to illustrate how one state's judiciary struggled to
define the practical meaning of its law of the land guarantee-a
counterpoint to Justice Thomas's view that such clauses had a simple
The Article concludes by
meaning that was uniformly understood.
proposing factors to help guide contemporary originalist jurists in applying
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause based on the view presented in
this Article.
I.

JUSTICE THOMAS'S VIEw OF "LIBERTY"

In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court's 2015 decision
establishing a constitutional right for same-sex couples to wed, Justice
Thomas argues Due Process liberty is merely the absence of physical

7. In various respects, this thesis resembles arguments made by, inter alia, Frederick
Mark Gedicks, An OriginalistDefense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, HigherLaw Constitutionalism,and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585 (2009) (arguing from
the historical record that natural and other rights customarily recognized and enforced at
common law are part of the due process protections), John Harrison, Substantive Due
Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REv. 493 (1997) (critiquing possible textbased theories of substantive due process and the possibility that the Due Process Clauses
are terms of art), and Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an OriginalMeaning?
On Originalism,Due Process, ProceduralInnovation ...and Parking Tickets, 60 OKLA. L.
REv. 1 (2007) (arguing that the Due Process Clauses were not written in originalist terms
but rather mandate courts to use common law reasoning to govern procedural innovations
that relate to deprivations of life, liberty, or property).
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restraint.8 In this section of the dissent, Justice Thomas reviews, in
summary form, the history of the due process norm from the Magna Carta
of 1215 to the seventeenth century.9 His analysis is typical, though
abbreviated. He argues that the federal Due Process Clauses derive from
chapter 39 of the Magna Carta of 1215, which provided, "No free man shall
be taken, imprisoned, disseised, outlawed, banished, or in any way
destroyed, nor will We proceed against or prosecute him, except by the
lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land." 0 Later versions
of the Magna Carta modified this clause slightly." Justice Thomas notes
that Sir Edward Coke in the seventeenth century interpreted "by the law of
the land" to mean the same thing as "by due process of the common law" in
the second part of his influential Institutes of the Laws of England,
published in 1642.12
Justice Thomas then discusses Blackstone.13 Blackstone opens the
substance of his first Commentaries, originally published in 1765, with a
discussion of "the absolute rights of" every Englishman. 14 In this chapter,
Blackstone advances his version of a social contract theory, arguing that
every person retains three absolute rights in society: the right of personal
security, the right of personal liberty, and the right to private property."s
These roughly equate to the more familiar triad of life, liberty, and
property, but Blackstone defines "personal liberty" narrowly as "the power
of loco-motion, of changing situation, or removing one's person to
8. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2632 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting 1
[L]iberty' most likely refers to 'the power of loco-motion, of
changing situation, or removing one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination
may direct; without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law."').
BLACKSTONE, supra note 1) (1"

9. Id.
10. Id.; see also MAGNA

CARTA OF 1215 ch. 39, reprintedin

A.E.

DICK HOWARD, THE

ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 385, 388

(1968).
11.

WELLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT
CHARTER OF KING JOHN 383, 383-86 (2d. ed. 1914). The most common English-language
formulation, used for instance in 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *45, is from the Magna Carta of 1225 and reads:
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his freehold, or
liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed;
nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his
peers, or by the law of the land.
But cf McKECHNIE, supra, at 375-76 n.3 (disputing the translation).
12. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2632 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also COKE, supra note
11, at *45, *50.
13. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2632-33 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
14. 1 BLACKSTONE, supranote 1, at 121-45.
15. Id.
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whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct; without imprisonment
or restraint, unless by due course of law." 16 Blackstone describes the
Magna Carta as protecting these absolute rights, apparently linking this
protection chiefly to the Magna Carta's law of the land clause.17
Justice Thomas then briefly summarizes the development of the due
process constitutional norm between 1765 and 1791:
The Framers drew heavily upon Blackstone's formulation, adopting
provisions in early State Constitutions that replicated Magna Carta's
language, but were modified to refer specifically to "life, liberty, or
property." State decisions interpreting these provisions between the
founding and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment almost
uniformly construed the word "liberty" to refer only to freedom from
physical restraint....
In enacting the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the Framers
similarly chose to employ the "life, liberty, or property" formulation,
though they otherwise deviated substantially from the States' use of Magna
Carta's language in the Clause. When read in light of the history of that
formulation, it is hard to see how the "liberty" protected by the Clause
could be interpreted to include anything broader than freedom from
physical restraint. That was the consistent usage of the time when "liberty"
was paired with "life" and "property." And that usage avoids rendering
superfluous those protections for "life" and "property." 18
Justice Thomas then concludes, "If the Fifth Amendment uses 'liberty' in
this narrow sense, then the Fourteenth Amendment likely does as well." 19
Justice Thomas bolsters his argument about the meaning of liberty
prior to the Fourteenth Amendment by citing two Harvard Law Review
articles: an 1890 piece by Charles E. Shattuck, The True Meaning of the
Term "Liberty" in Those Clauses in the Federal and State Constitutions
Which Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property," and a 1926 article by Charles
Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 0 These
citations invite our review of these sources.
Justice Thomas's interpretation of Due Process liberty largely
Shattuck seems to argue against early
parallels Shattuck's view.
16. Id at 134.
17. Id. at 133-35.
18. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2633 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citations

omitted).
19. Id
20. Id (first citing Charles Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 39 HARv. L. REv. 431, 441-45 (1926); then citing Charles E. Shattuck, The
True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in Those Clauses in the Federal and State
Constitutions Which Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property", 4 HARV. L. REv. 365, 382

(1890)).
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He traces the
proponents of incorporation and substantive due process.
prototypes of the federal Due Process Clauses from the Magna Carta
through the seventeenth century in greater detail than Justice Thomas's
dissent.2 2 Shattuck reviews the various meanings of "liberty" and
"liberties" in the legal texts from this period. 23 He admits the broad
meaning of these terms but notes these texts did not use "liberty" in
Due Process liberty, he
conjunction with "life" and "property." 24
concludes, therefore must have a different meaning. 25 He argues the
American constitutions use "life, liberty, or property" "each to express a
special kind of right." 26 He continues, "It is as unreasonable to say that
'liberty,' in th[e Fifth Amendment], includes all civil rights, as it is to say
that the term 'life' includes them, or that the term 'property' includes
them."2 7 He argues this would make the Due Process Clause "an absurdity
on its face."2 8 He comes to his point: "The fact is that each of these terms
has a peculiar and definite meaning, and it seems clear, on the whole,
considering the history of the clause, that the term in question means
personal liberty, or freedom of the person from restraint., 29
After rejecting the notion that Due Process liberty includes all civil
rights, Shattuck argues it does not include any civil rights beyond freedom
from restraint. 3 0 He advances five arguments. First, he asserts that the
American due process and law of the land clauses are "mere copies" of the
21. Compare Shattuck, supra note 20, at 366 (describing the danger of the "manifest
tendency to regard constitutional prohibitions as a panacea for moral and political evils, to
look upon courts of law, as distinguished from legislatures, as the only real protectors of
individual rights, and to trust to the courts for remedies for evils resulting entirely from a
failure to attend to political duties"), with Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1878)
("[T]he docket of this court is crowded with cases in which we are asked to hold that State
courts and State legislatures have deprived their own citizens of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. There is here abundant evidence that there exists some strange
misconception of the scope of th[e Due Process Clause] as found in the fourteenth
amendment. In fact, it would seem, from the character of many of the cases before us, and
the arguments made in them, that the clause under consideration is looked upon as a means
of bringing to the test of the decision of this court the abstract opinions of every
unsuccessful litigant in a State court of the justice of the decision against him, and of the
merits of the legislation on which such a decision may be founded.").
22. Shattuck, supra note 20, at 369-78.
23. Id at 368-78.
24. Id at 373, 375.
25. Id at 375.
26. Id
27. Id
28. Id
29. Id
30. Id at 378.
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Magna Carta's law of the land clause and that the Magna Carta did not
protect many of the civil rights one might presume Due Process liberty
includes.3 1 Second, he cites Blackstone and other writers to argue "liberty"
was used with "life" and "property" to mean simply personal liberty rather
than these additional civil rights, many of which were recent or subsequent
developments.3 2 He emphasizes Blackstone's narrow view of "personal
liberty": freedom from physical restraint.33 From this, he concludes,
"[Liberty]

would, therefore, naturally be used by the framers of our

constitutions in that sense." 34 Third, Shattuck argues other civil rights,
such as trial by jury, habeas corpus, and bearing arms, are only
instrumental or subordinate rights.35 He distinguishes these from life,
liberty, and property, which he presents as substantial or fundamental
rights. Fourth, he argues these other civil rights are already protected in
the federal and state constitutions and that reading Due Process liberty as
including them would be redundant.3 ' Finally, he argues that if Due
Process liberty includes these other rights, they can be taken away by due
process of law. 3 8 He concludes, therefore, that "liberty" in the Due Process
Clauses "means nothing more or less than freedom of the person from
restraint," though he acknowledges this view is "repudiated by several
[judicial] decisions." 39

Warren, arguing against the doctrines of incorporation and substantive
due process thirty-five years later, 4 0 relies on Shattuck's article to assert
that Due Process liberty means only freedom from physical restraint. 4 1
Warren argues that "[i]t is unquestionable that when the First Congress
adopted the Fifth Amendment and inserted the Due Process Clause, they
[sic] took it directly from the then existing State Constitutions, and they
[sic] took it with the meaning it then bore."4 2 He echoes Shattuck's

31. Id at 376. To be fair, Shattuck elsewhere acknowledges that American
constitutional law of the land and due process clauses are not "mere copies" of the Magna
Carta, but he construes the addition of "life, liberty, and property" to the traditional
language as a "summary" or "supererogation." Id at 375.
32. Id at 368, 377-78.
33. Id. at 377.
34. Id. at 376.
35. Id. at 380.

36. Id.
37. Id. at 380-82
38. Id. at 381-82.
39. Id at 382.

40. See Warren, supra note 20, at 431-33.
41. Id at 440 n.22.
42. Id at 440.
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objection that reading Due Process liberty as including, for instance,
freedom of speech would mean Congress could take away freedom of
speech after providing due process.43 Warren then summarizes preFourteenth Amendment parallels for substantive due process case law.4
He concludes that some states regarded due process as having no relation to
substantive legislation. 45 Other states, however, interpreted "property" and
"liberty" as including a restricted substantive content, though only a few
courts actually construed the meaning of "liberty" in this context.46 He
discusses a case in which "liberty" was interpreted fairly broadly, treating it
as an aberration.4 7 Justice Thomas, however, tries to interpret the case as
supporting the originalists' Due Process fallacy.48
In summary, then, the originalists' Due Process fallacy, as portrayed
in Justice Thomas's Obergefell dissent, rests on five arguments or
assumptions: First, American due process and law of the land clauses are
all substantially identical with each other and with their predecessors.4 9
Second, "life," "liberty," and "property" in these clauses each have a
separate and distinct meaning.5 0 Third, "liberty" in these clauses means
"personal liberty," which in turn means freedom from physical restraint, as
stated by Blackstone." Fourth, interpreting Due Process liberty as freedom
from physical restraint is the view most consistent with the text of the
Constitution.52 Finally, this interpretation is also the one most consistent

43. Id. at 441.
44. Id at 441-45.
45. Id at 442.
46. Id. at 442-44.
47. Id at 444-45 (discussing Herman v. State, 8 Ind. 545, 558-63 (1855)).
48. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2633 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing
Warren, supra note 20, at 444-45, as support for the proposition that "one
case . . identified as a possible exception to that view merely used broad language about
liberty in the context of a habeas corpus proceeding-a proceeding classically associated
with obtaining freedom from physical restraint").
49. See id ("The Framers drew heavily upon Blackstone's formulation, adopting
provisions in early State Constitutions that replicated Magna Carta's language, but were
modified to refer specifically to 'life, liberty, or property."'); see also Shattuck, supra note
20, at 368, 375-76; Warren, supra note 20, at 440.
50. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2632-33 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Shattuck,
supra note 20, at 369, 375; Warren, supra note 20, at 440-42.
51. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2632-33 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Shattuck, supra note 20,
at 369, 375-80; Warren, supra note 20, at 440.
52. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2632-33 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Shattuck, supra note 20,
at 369, 375-76, 380-81; Warren, supra note 20, at 440-41.
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with judicial interpretations prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment.5 3 This Article reviews and disputes each of these in turn.
To be completely fair to Justice Thomas, he goes on to present an
alternative theory of Due Process liberty in his Obergefell dissent that is
somewhat more compatible with the thesis of this Article. 54 He describes
the historical view, based on the influential philosophy of John Locke, that
liberty is broader than Blackstone envisioned; but, Justice Thomas argues it
remains strictly a negative right: freedom from government action, rather
than a right to any government entitlement.55 In this interpretation,
according to Justice Thomas, "The founding-era idea of civil liberty as
natural liberty constrained by human law necessarily involved only those
freedoms that existed outside of govermnent."56 This Article will not
analyze this secondary argument in depth. It focuses on Justice Thomas's
primary argument: that Due Process liberty is solely freedom from physical
restraint.
II.

THE MANY LAW OF THE LAND AND DUE PROCESS CLAUSES

The originalists' Due Process fallacy presumes eighteenth-century
American prototypes of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause were
substantially identical-"mere copies" of the.Magna Carta law of the land
clause, as Shattuck puts it.57 Justice Thomas acknowledges textual
differences among the state. clauses, but he still assumes they have
These views are not supported by the
substantially identical meanings.
historical record. There were, in fact, many different due process and law
of the land clauses adopted in America in the fifteen years preceding the
Fifth Amendment's ratification, with substantial differences in both their
language and their meaning.
In particular, between 1776 and 1784, eight states and the territory of
Vermont adopted "law of the land" clauses in their constitutional textsi.e., prototype due process clauses derived from chapter 39 of the Magna
Carta of 1215 or its progeny and typically employing "law [or laws] of the

53. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2633 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Warren, supra note 21. But
cf Shattuck, supra note 20 (acknowledging his interpretation of liberty has been repudiated
by several courts).
54. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2634-35 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
5 5. Id.
56. Id. at 2635.
57. Shattuck, supra note 20, at 376; Warren, supranote 20, at 440.
58. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2632-33 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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land" language. 59 Two states adopted statutory law of the land clauses:
Connecticut in 178460 and Virginia in 1786.61 The Continental Congress
used a law of the land clause in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.62 New
York adopted a collection of statutory due process clauses in 1787.63 In
1788, Virginia and North Carolina proposed law of the land clauses for the
federal Constitution, and New York's ratification that year expressly
presumed the federal Constitution would afford due process protections.64
The text of these sixteen clauses differed in who and what they protected,
in the protections afforded, and when the protections applied.
To review this history in more detail, Virginia's June 1776 declaration
of rights was the first constitutional document of the period to employ a
law of the land clause.6 ' This clause did not use either the traditional
Magna Carta language for the interests protected or "life" or "property."
59. MD. CONST. of 1776, decl. of rights XXI; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII; N.H. CONST.
pt. I, art. XV; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XIII; N.C. CONST. of 1776, decl. of rights XII; PA.
CONST. of 1776, decl. of rights IX; S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XLI; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I,
art. X; VA. DECL. OF RIGHTS OF 1776, § 8. Vermont's territory was claimed by New York,
but Vermont asserted its independence as a sovereign state in January 1777. THE
DECLARATION AND PETITION OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE NEW HAMPsHIRE GRANTS, TO
CONGRESS, ANNOUNCING THE DISTRICT To BE A FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATE (1777),

reprinted in

VERMONT STATE PAPERS 70, 70-73 (William Slade ed., 1823); 2 ZADOCK
THOMPSON, HISTORY OF VERMONT 51 (Stacy & Jameson 1853). This is reflected in the
preamble to its constitution of 1777. VT. CONST. of 1777, pmbl.
60. 1 THE PUB. STAT. LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONN. tit I, § 2 (Hudson & Goodwin
1808) [hereinafter CONN. STAT. OF 1808].
61. An Act Declaring That None Shall Be Condemned Without Trial, and That Justice
Shall Not Be Sold or Deferred, REV. BILLS OF 1779 ch. 47, reprintedin 12 THE STATUTES AT
LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE

LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 186 (William Waller Hening ed., 1823) [hereinafter
HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE]; REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF REVISORS APPOINTED BY THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA 42 (Dixon & Holt 1784); JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 13, 64, 69, 72, 133 (Thomas W. White
ed., 1827) (Oct 17, 1785); JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

31, 34,37,39,62 (Thomas W. White ed., 1827) (Oct. 17, 1785).
62. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States Northwest
of the River Ohio, art. II (1787), reprinted in HOWARD W. PRESTON, DOCUMENTS
ILLUSTRATIVE OF AMERICAN HISTORY

1606-1863, at 240, 247 (1886) [hereinafter Northwest

Ordinance].
63. An Act Concerning the Rights of the Citizens of this State (1787), reprinted in 1
LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK ch. 1, §§ 2-5, at 289-90 (Thomas Greenleaf ed., 1792).
64. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 1786-1870, at 192, 268, 379 (Dep't of State 1894) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY].

65. VA. DECL. OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 8. New Hampshire adopted the first state
constitution on January 5, 1776. N.H. CONST. In March 1776, South Carolina followed
suit. S.C. CONST. of 1776. Neither constitution contained a law of the land clause.
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Instead, it read, "[T]hat no man be deprived of his liberty, except by the law
of the land or the judgment of his peers."6 6 Virginia placed this clause in a
provision related to criminal procedure, implying it was limited to penal
matters.6 7 Pennsylvania (1776) followed Virginia's lead in its law of the
land clause, and Vermont (1777) followed Pennsylvania's lead. 8 A decade
later, in 1787, the Continental Congress passed the Northwest Ordinance,
an act establishing the government of the Northwest Territory (present-day
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and parts of Minnesota). 69 It
contained a law of the land clause regulating deprivations of "liberty or
property," without reference to "life," even though the same article of the
Ordinance referenced capital punishment.70
Maryland took a different course in its 1776 declaration of rights,
placing the following language in an independent section: "That no
freeman ought to be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold,
liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed,
or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment of his
peers, or by the law of the land." 71 This joined "life, liberty, or property"
with traditional Magna Carta language describing the interests protected
and divorced the provision, at least to some degree, from the context of
criminal prosecutions. 72 Two states adopted this model in their pre-1789
state constitutions, 73 as did Virginia and North Carolina in their proposed
amendments to the federal Constitution in 1788.74 North Carolina's 1776
constitutional provision, for instance, used Maryland's formula in an
independent section but eliminated the reference to judgment of peers.7
Two more states adapted Maryland's language but kept the clause as part
of a larger provision related to criminal matters.7 6 One of these was
Massachusetts's constitution of 1780, which reworked Maryland's
language to eliminate the reference to "liberties" while retaining the term
66. VA. DECL. OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 8 (emphasis added).
67. Id.
68. PA. CONST. of 1776, decl. of rights IX; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, art. X. See also
infra note 94 (discussing the drafting of the early declarations of rights by the various
states).
69. Northwest Ordinance, supranote 62.
70. Id.
71. MD. CONST. of 1776, decl. of rights XXI.
72. See discussion in supranote 11.
73. N.C. CONST. of 1776, decl. of rights XII; S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XLL.
74. RESOLUTION OF THE NORTH CAROLINA CONVENTION, reprinted in DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 64, at 266, 268; RESOLUTION OF THE VIRGINIA CONVENTION, reprinted
in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supranote 64, at 377, 379.
75. N.C. CONST. of 1776, decl. of rights XII.
76. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. XV.
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"liberty." 7 Massachusetts's clause also protected only its "subjects," not
all men or freemen.7 8 Moreover, some states also adopted clauses that
seem to provide a secondary law of the land guarantee, such as
Massachusetts's provision that read: "Each individual of the society has a
right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property,
according to standing laws."7 9
Meanwhile, Connecticut adopted a broad statutory law of the land
clause in 1784 that appears to have reached well beyond criminal matters,
though it employed the phrase "unless clearly warranted by the Laws of
this State" instead of "law [or laws] of the land."80 In 1786, Virginia
adopted a statutory law of the land clause that paralleled the 1225 Magna
Carta provision almost verbatim.8 ' This statute provided, in relevant part:
B[e] it enacted by the General Assembly, That no freeman shall be taken
or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties or free customs,
or be outlawed or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed, nor shall the
commonwealth pass upon him, nor condemn him; but by lawful judgment
of his peers, or by the laws of the land. Justice or right shall not be sold,
denied, or deferred, to any man.82
New York presents a unique case. New York adopted an untraditional
law of the land clause in its 1777 constitution. It provided, "[N]o member
of this state shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of the rights or
privileges secured to the subjects of this state, by this constitution, unless
by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers." Read in conjunction
with a separate constitutional clause that expressly continues the common
law and statutory law of England,84 this law of the land clause promises

&

77. See MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII.
78. Id. Notably, the initial draft text of the Massachusetts constitution, prepared
substantially by John Adams, had this law of the land clause as an independent section, but
the section was merged with one related to criminal prosecutions by a subsequent
committee. See MINUTES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY
(Feb. 28, 1780), in JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION FOR FRAMING A CONSTITUTION OF
GOVERNMENT FOR THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 150-51 (Dutton & Wentworth
1832); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII; see also Harry A. Cushing, History of the Transition
from Provincial to Commonwealth Government in Massachusetts, 7 STUD. HIST. ECON.

PuB. L. 1, 234-35 (1896).
79. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. X.
80. CONN. STAT. OF 1808, supra note 60.
81. See An Act Declaring That None Shall Be Condemned Without Trial, and That
Justice Shall Not Be Sold or Deferred, supra note 61; see also discussion in supra note 11.
82. An Act Declaring That None Shall Be Condemned Without Trial, and That Justice
Shall Not Be Sold or Deferred, supra note 61.
83. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XIII.
84. Id. art. XXXV.
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broad protections. Then, New York adopted a statutory bill of rights in
1787 that included the following provisions:
Second, That no citizen of this state shall be taken or imprisoned, or be

disseised of his or her freehold, or liberties, or free customs; or outlawed, or
exiled, or condemned, or otherwise destroyed, but by lawful judgment of
his or her peers, or by due process of law.
Third, That no citizen of this state shall be taken or imprisoned for any
offence, upon petition or suggestion, unless it be by indictment or
presentment of good and lawful men of the same neighbourhood where
such deeds be done, in due manner, or by due process of law.
Fourth, That no person shall be put to answer without presentment before
justices, or matter of record, or due process of law, according to the law of
the land; and if any thing be done to the contrary, it shall be void in law,
and holden for error.
Fifth, That no person, of what estate or condition soever, shall be taken,
or imprisoned, or disinherited, or put to death, without being brought to
answer by due process of law; and that no person shall be put out of his or
her franchise or freehold, or lose his or her life or limb, or goods and
chattels, unless he or she be duly brought to answer, and be fore-judged of
the same, by due course of law; and if any thin be done contrary to the
same, it shall be void in law, and holden for none.
These provisions from New York's statute were the first proper American
due process clauses-the first time in the American legal texts that "due
process" appears in place of "law of the land." These clauses are drawn
chiefly from Coke's interpretation of the Magna Carta, rather than
Blackstone's.8 6 Coke's Institutes famously links due process to the Magna
Carta language that appears in the second section of this New York
statute.87 Coke's Institutes also employs language used in the third and
The language of the fifth section is
fourth sections of this statute.
likewise derived in part from Coke's Institutes.8 9 New York later ratified
85. An Act Concerning the Rights of the Citizens of this State, supra note 63; see also
Robert Emery, New York's Statutory Bill ofRights: A ConstitutionalCoelacanth, 19 TOURO

L. REV. 363, 369 (2003).
86.
87.
88.
89.

See COKE, supra note 11, at *46, *50.
Id.
Id
Id at *50. There were also more proximate sources for some (but not all) of the

language of these due process clauses, including THE CHARTER OF LIBERTYES AND
PRIVILEDGES GRANTED BY His ROYALL HIGHNESSE TO THE INHABITANTS OF NEW YORKE AND

ITS DEPENDENCYES paras. 15, 17 (1683), reprinted in 1 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK
FROM 1664 TO THE REVOLUTION 111, 113 (James B. Lyon 1896), AN ACT DECLAREING
WHAT ARE THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEDGES OF THEIR MAJESTIES SUBJECTS INHABITING WITHIN

THEIR PROvINcE OF NEW YORK

(1691), reprinted in 1 THE COLONIAL
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the United States Constitution on the express presumption that the federal
government would respect the right to "due process."90
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, ratified in 1791 but
identical to the text James Madison proposed to Congress in 1789,91 is an
original formulation of the constitutional norm. It is not a direct copy of
any of the prior state texts. Only New York used "due process" language,
in its statutory clauses and its ratification text. None of the states used
"life, liberty, and property" language alone to describe the interests
protected, at least in each state's primary due process or law of the land
clause.
Thus, the historical record demonstrates the early American law of the
land and due process clauses were not "mere copies" of the Magna Carta
provision. Moreover, the textual differences among these clauses support
substantially different interpretations. New York's protection of "the rights
or privileges secured to the subjects of this State, by this constitution, ,92 for
instance, is very different from the law of the land protections afforded by
Virginia, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Massachusetts, and other states, where
the primary law of the land clauses appear limited to the criminal context.9 3
The state conventions and legislatures formulating these constitutions and
statutes generally had the prior state constitutions (or drafts) available.94

FROM 1664 TO THE REVOLUTION, supra, at 244, 246, and the so-called 1628 PETITION OF
RIGHTS ¶ IV (1627), reprintedin 3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE, FROM THE FIRST YEAR OF KING
JAMES THE FIST TO THE TENTH YEAR OF THE REIGN OF KING WILLIAM THE THIRD 123 (Mark

Basket 1763).
90. RESOLUTION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION, reprintedin DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 64, at 190, 192.
91. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V (Due Process Clause), with 1 ANNALS OF THE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 433-36 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
92. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XIII.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67, 76, 83-85.
94. For instance, newspapers quickly circulated the draft of Virginia's declaration of
rights, and it made its way to Pennsylvania. A DeclarationofRights, VA. GAZETTE, Jun. 1,
1776, at 2; FIRST DRAFT OF THE VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (1776), reprinted in 1
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 1725-1792, at 276-82 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970); Brent
Tarter, The Virginia Bill of Rights, in To SECURE THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 37, 47-48
(Josephine F. Pacheco ed., 1993) (tracing the broad distribution of the draft). A draft of
Pennsylvania's declaration draws heavily from this text. AN ESSAY OF A DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS (1776), reprintedin Revisions of the Pennsylvania Declarationof Rights, [Between
29 July 1776 and 15 August 1776], FOUNDERS ONLINE (Nov. 26, 2017),
Maryland's declaration of rights draws from both
https://perma.cc/VZ2Q-QMC3.
Pennsylvania's and Virginia's declarations, with many additions and alterations. Compare,
e.g, MD. CONST. of 1776, decl. of rights II, VI-VII, with PA. CONST. of 1776, art. III, and
VA. DECL. OF RIGHTS OF 1776, §§ 5, 7. Delaware's declaration of rights is almost entirely
derivative of Maryland's draft declaration, though a few provisions draw from
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They could have adopted substantially identical language, but often they
chose to describe the protections afforded differently than their sister states.
One would imagine the American law of the land and due process
clauses from 1776 to 1789 would be the chief sources for understanding the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, but Justice Thomas, Shattuck, and
Warren do not discuss these clauses in any depth, much less the extant
drafts and discussions of these texts. The differences among these
provisions would certainly complicate the originalists' simple narrative of
the original understanding of Due Process liberty.
Ed. "LIFE, LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY": A UNIFIED TERM OF ART
Next, the originalists' Due Process fallacy portrays "life, liberty, or
This
property" as three separate terms, each with a distinct meaning.
interpretation is not unreasonable if one ignores the eighteenth-century
American texts discussed above.
Blackstone's Commentaries treat
personal security, personal liberty, and private property as distinct,96 as
does the Magna Carta formulation of the interests protected by the law of
the land clause. 97 But looking at the American texts sheds a different light
on the matter.
Virginia and Pennsylvania were the first states to adopt law of the land
Their clauses stated in relevant part,
clauses during this period.
respectively, "no man be deprived of his liberty"9 9 and "nor can any man be

Pennsylvania's declaration instead. Compare DEL. DECL. OF RIGHTS, reprintedin SOURCES
OF OUR LIBERTIES 338-40 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1959), with THE DECL. AND CHARTER OF
RIGHTS (1776), https://perma.cc/3NAV-Z7HG, and MD. CONST. of 1776, and PA. CONST. Of
1776, decl. of rights II-1II, VIII-IX. North Carolina's delegate in the Continental Congress
sent the state legislature "the plans of Govt of several States," which likely included some of
the states' declarations of rights, in October 1776. Letter from William Hooper, Delegate
from N.C. to the Cont'l Cong., to the Congress at Halifax (Oct. 26, 1776), in 10 THE
COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 862-70 (William L. Saunders ed., Josephus
Daniels 1890). Vermont's convention used Pennsylvania's constitution as a model because
of the influence of Philadelphia citizen Dr. Thomas Young. 2 THOIPSON, supra note 59, at
51, 105-07. Dr. Young published a letter to the inhabitants of Vermont in April 1777
encouraging them in their opposition to New York's territorial claims and recommending
that they form a state constitution. Id He specifically recommended the constitution of
Pennsylvania as a model. Id
95. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2631-33 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Shattuck, supra note 20, at 369, 375; Warren, supra note 20, at 440.
96. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 123-36.
97. McKECHNIE, supranote 11, at 382-86.
98. PA. CONST. of 1776, decl. of rights IX; VA. DECL. OF RIGHTS OF 1776, § 8.
99. VA. DECL. OF RIGHTS OF 1776, § 8.
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justly deprived of his liberty." 00 The terms "life" and "property" were
absent. These clauses were each part of a section dedicated to the rights of
the criminally accused. To read "liberty" in these clauses as mere freedom
from physical restraint would mean Virginia and Pennsylvania greatly
narrowed the protections afforded in the Magna Carta law of the land
clause, which expressly regulated seizures of property and deprivations of
other legal privileges and rights in additional to physical restraints.101 It is
unlikely the freedom-loving patriots of 1776 in Virginia and Pennsylvania
would discard traditional rights preserved in the Magna Carta as they
drafted their declarations of rights. Instead, "liberty" in the context of
Virginia's and Pennsylvania's 1776 law of the land clauses was likely
intended as a single-word summary for all the particular interests protected
by the law of the land. It was likely intended to include at least all of the
interests protected in the Magna Carta, not simply freedom from physical
restraint.10 2
Maryland was the next state to act. As noted, Maryland brought
together traditional language-"no freeman ought to be taken, or
imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or
outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed"-and added "or deprived
100. PA. CONST. of 1776, decl. of rights IX.
101. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. To be fair, the legal interpretation
of this formulation was underdeveloped in Virginia and Pennsylvania case law prior to the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 added
"life" and "property" to the state's law of the land clause before state courts really construed
the meaning of "liberty" standing alone. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 9. Virginia courts
could, and at times did, rely on the state's statutory law of the land clause or directly on the
Magna Carta. See, e.g., Martin v. Snowden, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 100, 13940 (1868)
(discussing whether the forfeiture of property in satisfaction of delinquent tax was made
under sufficient due process of law); Warwick & Barksdale v. Mayo, 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 528,
538 (1860) arguing that the law of the land clause prevents justices of the peace from
deciding title to land by summary judgment); Kinney v. Beverley, 12 Va. (2 Hen. & M.)
318, 336.(1808) (stating that the "principle of moral justice, recognized by Magna Chartain
England, and by the statute of (Virginia]" requires that "no citizen shall be disseised of his
freehold, or be condemned, but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the laws of the
land"). The parallel "liberty" language in Vermont's declaration of rights was read
narrowly at times, but not so narrowly as to be absolutely limited to freedom from physical
restraint. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328, 361 (1855); In re Powers, 25 Vt. 261,
266-71 (1853).
102. Cf EDMUND RANDOLPH, HISTORY OF VIRGINIA 251-55 (Arthur H. Shaffer ed.,
1970) (stating section 8 of Virginia's declaration of rights "reenacts in substance modes of
defense for accused persons similar to those under the English law"); Respublica v. Oswald,
1 U.S. (1 Dali.) 319, 329 (Pa. 1788) (recording William Findley's views as to the traditional
protections afforded by Pennsylvania's law of the land clause in a legislative debate
concerning the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's issuance of a writ of attachment for contempt
of court).
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of his life, liberty, or property."103 To read "life, liberty, or property" in
this context as separate and distinct terms, with "liberty" equating to
freedom from physical restraint, must make the attentive reader curious.
Why would the likes of Charles Carroll of Carrollton and Samuel Chase
(both members of the committee drafting the text) 104 say both "no freeman
ought to be taken, or imprisoned" and "no freeman ought to be . .
deprived of his . .. liberty"? Similarly, how is being "disseized of [one's]
freehold" not subsumed within the meaning of being "deprived of ...
property"? There is, no doubt, substantial overlap between the traditional
and the new language in Maryland's formulation with respect to the
substance of rights protected, but treating "life, liberty, or property" as
terms that each have a discrete legal meaning would make this additional,
There is better interpretation
new language a useless redundancy.
available. Namely, Maryland's formula suggests "life, liberty, or property"
does not function as three distinct terms so much as a single term of art-a
phrase labeling all of those interests, discernable by reason, that are
preserved by the people under a Lockean social contract, interests the
government must not arbitrarily infringe.
John Locke (1632-1704) is the intellectual father of the political
philosophy prevalent in America during the era of the Revolution: the
social contract in which reason-not custom or royal prerogative-dictated
the just constitutional limits and duties of the government and the
obligations and rights of the governed.105 In the second of his Two
Treatises of Government, published anonymously in 1689,106 Locke argues
the purpose of government is to preserve each member's "Property," a term
he uses to describe a broad collection of interests that includes life, limb,
health, material goods and possessions, and another complex interest he
calls "Liberty." 107 Liberty, for Locke, is not license but rather is the right
of the person to act in society subject to the strictures of reason. 108 For
Locke, "Liberty" is a category of "Property."' 09 Locke summarizes these

103. MD. CONST. of 1776, decl. of rights XXI; see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
104. DAN FRIEDMAN, THE MARYLAND STATE CONSTITuTION 5 n.4 (G. Alan Tarr ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2011); PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTIONS OF THE PROVINCE OF
MARYLAND, HELD AT THE CITY OF ANNAPOLIS IN 1774, 1775, & 1776, at 184 (James Lucas
& E.K. Deaver eds., Jonas Green 1836).
105. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 1-2, 16 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1988) (1689); see also THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
LOCKE 226-51 (Vere Chappell ed., 1994).
106. LOCKE, supra note 105, at 7-8.
107. Id at 271, 329-30, 350.
108. Id. at 270-71, 277-78, 283-84, 309.
109. Id at 271, 350.
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"Property" interests in various ways in his text, but the most influential
formula he uses as a summary is "Life, Liberty, and Estate." 10 This triad
is, in fact, a summary-three terms that collectively represent the larger
whole that Locke calls "Property.""' Since the government's purpose is to
preserve its members' "Property," it is rationally prohibited from arbitrary
actions that infringe these interests." 2
Locke's successors often followed his methodology and adopted his
insights but altered his language. Blackstone, for instance, developed a
social contract theory in which he referenced Locke,1 3 but Blackstone
preferred to categorize the personal interests at the core of this theory as
personal security, personal liberty, and private property-a collection he
The
called "liberties" or "absolute rights" instead of "Property.
Declaration of Independence, by comparison, uses "Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness" to describe the core interests, which it identifies
collectively as "unalienable Rights." 1 5
Within this tradition, in which all personal interests protected under
the social contract were typically summarized into a few categories, which
were then often collectively identified by a single term, it is easy to
understand that Virginia and Pennsylvania used the single term "liberty" in
their law of the land clauses to describe succinctly all of the interests
protected by the clause-much as Locke uses the term "Property" and
Blackstone uses the term "liberties" to describe these interests." 6
Likewise, while Blackstone defines each term in his triad discretely, "life,
liberty, or property" can collectively represent the pantheon of personal
rights under the social contract, even those rights not easily reducible to
life, or to liberty, or to property."'
Read in this way, Maryland brought together both the traditional,
formalistic language of the Magna Carta and parallel philosophic language
derived from John Locke to ensure a broad, though somewhat imprecise,
scope of protected interests. The use of "life, liberty, or property" was not
mere redundancy but an effort to capture all of the interests protected by
the social contract. If something was protected in the Magna Carta law of
the land clause, it was protected through the traditional language; if
110. Id at 350.

111. Id
112. Id. at 307-09, 330-31, 350-63.

113. 1

BLACKSTONE,

supra note 1, at 126.

114. Id at 123-36.
115. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
116. See supranotes 98-100, 108, 112, 115 and accompanying text.
117. Cf LOCKE, supra note 105, at 271, 350 (using "Life, Liberty, and Estate" as a
summary for many different personal interests).
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something was a natural right preserved under the social contract, it was
protected under the new language. Some interests fall into both categories,
accounting for the apparent redundancy. "Life, liberty, or property" in this
context, therefore, does not operate as three separate and distinct terms but
rather a collective term of art. Massachusetts's formula makes the Lockean
link even more apparent. It adds "life, liberty, or estate," rather than "life,
liberty, or property," to traditional law of the land language.1 1 s As noted,
Locke's second Treatise of Government used "Estate" rather than
"property" in his triad with "Life" and "Liberty."ll 9 By using "life, liberty,
or estate," Massachusetts's law of the land clause signals more clearly the
Lockean basis of its added protections.
Moreover, the American state constitutional texts of 1776 to 1788not simply the law of the land and due process clauses, but the texts in their
entirety-seem to employ "liberty" standing alone almost interchangeably
with "life, liberty, and property" or similar language. For instance,
Virginia's declaration of rights identified "the enjoyment of life and liberty,
with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety" as "inherent rights" of man. 12 0 It then used
"liberty" three more times throughout the document (not including the law
of the land clause) to reference the beneficial order of society obtained and
preserved through good government-i.e., the social order in which man
enjoys his inherent rights under the protection of the law. 1 2 1 Pennsylvania
similarly identified man's "inherent and inalienable rights" that included
"enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. 122
It also asserted, "[E]very member of society hath a right to be protected in
the enjoyment of life, liberty and property, and therefore is bound to
contribute his proportion towards the expen[s]e of that protection. 12 3 It
then repeatedly used "liberty" alone much as Virginia's declaration did,
implying the absence of liberty proves the absence of good government.1 2 4
Variations on this theme continued through most of the constitutional texts
of the period and in the federal constitutional ratifications of Virginia,
North Carolina, and New York.1 2 5 In short, these texts suggest "liberty"
118. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII.
119. LOcKE, supra note 105, at 350.
120. VA. DECL. OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 1.
121. See id §§ 12-13, 15.
122. PA. CONST. of 1776, decl. of rights I.
123. Id. decl. of rights VIII.
124. See id decl. of rights XIII-XIV.
125. See MD. CONST. of 1776, decl. of rights IV-V, XV, XVIII, XXVI, XXX-XXXI,
XXXIII; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, arts. I-II, X, XII, XVII-XVIII, XXIX; N.H. CONST. pt. I, arts.
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standing alone was practically an abbreviation of the right to life, liberty,
and property under the Lockean social contract. 126
One might question why the Fifth Amendment would employ "life,
liberty, or property" rather than just "liberty" if these terms were
substantially interchangeable. Justice Thomas uses this point, arguing his
narrow reading of Due Process liberty "avoids rendering superfluous those
protections for 'life' and 'property."' 1 2 7 The eighteenth-century American
texts suggest an alternative. In proposing the original federal Due Process
Clause in 1789, Madison likely balanced the competing interests of brevity,
breadth, and elegance, qualities variously represented in the formulas
adopted first by Virginia, Maryland, and Massachusetts, respectively.
Madison, therefore, used "life, liberty, or property" as a unified term of art
to describe the broad and imprecise class of interests protected; namely, all
rights that are properly protected by due process under the social contractrights discernible through reasoning about the social contract. Had
Madison used "liberty" alone within this historical context, the term (and
the clause) could have been interpreted too narrowly, including for instance
in the way the originalists' Due Process fallacy presently interprets the term
as merely freedom from physical restraint.
IV. FREEDOM FROM PHYSICAL RESTRAINT OR FROM ARBITRARY
GOVERNMENT?

The originalists' Due Process fallacy next employs Blackstone's
narrow definition of "personal liberty"-freedom from physical restraintas the interpretive key to "liberty" in American due process and law of the
land clauses, particularly in the Fifth Amendment. 12 8 This definition comes
from Blackstone's chapter on the rights of individuals in the first volume of
his Commentaries.129 Justice Thomas justifies this approach by asserting
"[t]he Framers drew heavily upon Blackstone's formulation" in the state
constitutions, 130 but there is little decent evidence supporting Justice
II, V, X, XII, XVII, XXV, XXXV; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, arts. VI, XXXVIII; N.C. CONST. of
1776, decl. of rights XI, XIII, XV, XVII, XXI, XXIV; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, arts. I, IX,
XV, XVI; RESOLUTION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION, supra note 90, at 190-93;
RESOLUTION OF THE NORTH CAROLINA CONVENTION, supra note 74, at 266"9; RESOLUTION

OF THE VIRGINIA CONVENTION, supra note 74, at 377-80.

126. Cf Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2634-35 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(discussing the Lockean notion of civil liberty).
127. Id. at 2633.
128. Id. at 2632-33; Shattuck, supra note 20, at 369, 375-80; Warren, supra note 20, at
440.
129.

1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 121.

130. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2633 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Thomas's assertion. Instead, the American states likely developed their
due process and law of the land clauses independently or substantially
independently of Blackstone.'
Blackstone's Commentaries were first published in England between
1765 and 1769, and they were not published in America until 1771 to
1772.132 While lawyers and jurists used the Commentaries as an accessible
articulation of contemporary English law, Blackstone's constitutional ideas
were initially viewed by some with suspicion; critics argued that
Blackstone presented Tory notions antithetical to the Whig values of the
American Revolution.133 Coke's works had been the chief texts for
understanding the English constitution, including the Magna Carta, for
generations in America.134 Locke and other social contract philosophers
were also widely read in America before Blackstone's Commentaries
arrived on American shores.13 ' The drafters of these American texts were
thus generally trained through Coke and guided by Locke, not Blackstone,
in constitutional matters.
The author has found no reference to Blackstone's Commentaries in
close connection with the adoption of any American law of the land or due
process clause prior to Madison's formulation of the first federal Due
Process clause.13 6 Moreover, the Journals of the Continental Congress,
covering 1774 to 1789, record only two express references to
Blackstone,' 3 ' despite repeated use of "life, liberty, and property" or similar
language. 3 8 Farrand's Records of the FederalConvention also shows only

131. Cf id at 2634-35 ("The founding-era understanding of liberty was heavily
influenced by John Locke.").
132. HOWARD, supranote 10, at 125.
133. See, e.g, id at 130-31.
134. Id. at 117-32.
135. Id. at 119.
136. This research has included, inter alia, the available journals, constitutions, or draft
constitutions of Virginia (1776), Pennsylvania (1776, 1790), Maryland (1776), Delaware
(1776), North Carolina (1776, 1777), New York (1777), South Carolina (1778),
Massachusetts (1780), as well as Vermont's Council of Censors (1785). Most of the other
relevant journals have been lost.
137. A Centwy of Lawmaking for a New Nation, LIBRARY OF CONG.,
https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/hlawquery.html (search conducted on Aug. 22, 2017, using
the search term "blackstone or black. or bl."). These references are found at 3 JOURNALS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 503 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1905)
(1775), [hereinafter JOURNALs], (discussing national debt) and 24 JOURNALS, supra, at 89
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922) (1783) (recommending that Congress purchase Blackstone's
Commentaries).
138. See, e.g, 1 JouRNALs, supra note 137, at 67, 105-06 (Declaration and Resolves of
the First Continental Congress and Address to the Inhabitants of Quebec); 5 JOURNALS,
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two references to Blackstone. 13 9 Elliot's Debates contains several more
references, 14 0 suggesting the growing influence of Blackstone in
approximately the last decade-and-a-half of the eighteenth century. This
increasing influence is also reflected in case law, but very few eighteenthcentury cases cite Blackstone's chapter on the absolute rights of
individuals, and these cases do not support the originalists' narrow view of
Due Process liberty. 141 Blackstone's Commentaries were a major influence
on early nineteenth-century American law, but the American formulations
of due process and law of the land clauses were largely established by that
time.142 Blackstone, therefore, was not likely the primary source for
understanding "liberty" or the chief source for "life, liberty, or property"
language between 1776 and 1791.
A broader concept of liberty was current at the time, as Justice
Thomas concedes subsequently in his Obergefell dissent. 14 3 In fact, Justice

supra note 137, at 510-12 (1906) (1776) (Declaration of the Thirteen United States of
America).
139. A Century of Lawmakingfor a New Nation, supra note 137. These references are
found at I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 472 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) (related to equality of representation), and 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra, at 448 (related to ex post facto laws).
140. A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation, supra note 137. These references
include, inter alia, Letter from Hon. Richard Henry Lee, Delegate in Cong. from the State of

Va., to Governor Edmund Randolph (Oct. 16, 1787), in 1

DEBATES OF THE SEVERAL STATE

CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE
GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN

1787, at 503, 503-04 (Johnathan Elliot 2d ed.

rev., J.B. Lippincott Co. 1891), [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]; 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra, at 423, 432, 437, 455, 518 (Pennsylvania debates); 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra, at
501, 506, 510, 512-13, 544 (Virginia debates); 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra, at 63, 278
(North Carolina and South Carolina debates).
141. E.g, Toogood v. Scott, 2 H. & McH. 26,28 (Md. 1782) (stating the proposition that
all persons are free by nature, related to burden of proof in a petition for freedom for a
person held in bondage).
142. HOWARD supranote 10, at 268-74.
143. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2634-35 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas argues that "[t]he founding-era understanding of liberty was heavily
influenced by John Locke." Id at 2634. He distinguishes between "civil liberty" and
"natural liberty." Id at 2635. "Civil liberty" is "natural liberty constrained by human law,"
and natural liberty is the Lockean notion of perfect freedom within the bounds of the law of
nature. Id Thomas then argues that "civil liberty" is only a negative liberty, and he argues
that allowing only same-sex marriages does not restrict the behavior of same-sex couples.
Id. Notably, however, in moving from the notion of "civil liberty" to "negative liberty,"
Justice Thomas relies on an interpretation of Locke, not Locke's work itself Id (citing
JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 56
(1988)).
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Thomas recently described this notion of liberty well in a separation-ofpowers context:
At the center of the Framers' dedication to the separation of powers was
individual liberty. The Federalist No. 47, at 302 (J. Madison) (quoting
Baron de Montesquieu for the proposition that "'[t]here can be no liberty
where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person,
or body of magistrates'). This was not liberty in the sense of freedom
from all constraint, but liberty as described by Locke: "to have a standing
rule to live by ...

made by the legislative power," and to be free from "the

inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man."
Locke § 22, at 13. At the heart of this liberty were the Lockean private
rights: life, liberty, and property. If a person could be deprived of these
private rights on the basis of a rule (or a will) not enacted by the legislature,
then he was not truly free. 144
Shattuck, too, concedes prior British texts used the term "liberty" or
"liberties" to mean more than absence of physical restraint, including many
civil rights. 145 A.E. Dick Howard shows the Americans used "liberty" in
this broader sense in their constitutional debates with the Crown.146 John
Phillip Reid has argued that the English of this period understood liberty as

144. Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1245 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); see also McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 813-15 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part) (describing "liberties" as interchangeable with "rights," "privileges,"
"immunities," and "freedoms" from Blackstone to Reconstruction and admitting, "The fact
that a particular interest was designated as a 'privilege' or 'immunity,' rather than a 'right,'
'liberty,' or 'freedom,' revealed little about its substance."). Justice Thomas's description of
Lockean liberty in this concurrence seems somewhat at odds with his description of
Lockean liberty in his Obergefell dissent. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2631 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). The conclusions, however, are both consistent with the Lockean notion that the
legislature is the supreme branch of government, a notion that may inform Justice Thomas's
opposition to substantive due process. Id. at 2631-37. Locke, however, conceived of a
government with only two branches-the legislature and the executive-and he identified
rational limits on the legislative authority, including both the duty not to delegate its powers
and the duty not to act arbitrarily in depriving a person of his "Property." See infra text
accompanying note 154. In Ass 'n ofAm RRs., Justice Thomas uses this Lockean reasoning
to void a legislative attempt to delegate its powers. 135 S. Ct. at 1245 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). If the judiciary would likewise enforce the Lockean prohibition against
arbitrary actions of the legislature, one could have a practice akin to judicial review
employing substantive due process reasoning. But because Locke did not consider judicial
review as a tool for enforcing the rational limits of legislative powers under the social
contract, and indeed did not contemplate the judiciary as a separate branch of government,
the debate concerning the merits of substantive due process as it exists today must proceed
on other grounds.
145. Shattuck, supranote 20, at 368, 371-73, 375.
146. See generally HowARD supra note 10, at 14-112, 185-202.
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the contrary of arbitrary government. 147 This resembles Locke's use of the
term in his second Treatise.14 8 This notion of liberty is materially broader
than freedom from physical restraint.
The American due process and law of the land clauses represent, to a
greater or lesser degree, parallel attempts to capture or embody in
constitutional law this notion of liberty as the contrary of arbitrary
government. To appreciate this idea of liberty and its relation to the history
of due process in early American constitutionalism, one should grasp the
prior tension in English law between legal formalism and legal
philosophy. 149 Legal philosophy can be understood as the discipline
directed to a perfect understanding of jurisprudential matters, asking
abstract questions such as "What is the law?" and "What is the best form of
government?" 5 0 Legal formalism embodies the methods and devices used
in law to address the practical concerns of jurisprudence, such as "How do
we write this constitution so it will work for this nation?"' 51
The Magna Carta's law of the land clause is largely an example of
legal formalism. It was born as a practical, legal precept insisting on legal
forms and processes to restrain King John's perceived abuses of power.15 2
These legal forms and processes-i.e., law of the land or judgment of
peers-were to provide a mechanism or forum to resolve certain debates
about appropriate uses of coercive government power. By contrast,
Locke's Two Treatises is an excellent example of legal philosophy.5 3 He
approached the need to restrain government power through philosophic
reasoning about the social contract. Locke ultimately identifies four legal

147. JoHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE

AUTHORITY TO LEGISLATE 142-44 (1991); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF

THE AlviERIcAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 37 (1993). See generally REm, supra
note 143.
148. Cf HOWARD, supra note 10, at 196 (arguing legal scholars like Coke and
philosophers like Locke "were concerned with the same problem: how arbitrary power
might be limited so that individual rights might be secured."). See generally LOCKE, supra
note 105, at 265-428.
149. Cf HOWARD, supra note 10, at 188-202 (discussing the lack of clear distinction
between natural rights and legal rights in American discourse of the time).
150. Legal Philosophy, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1990) (defining "legal
philosophy" by reference to its second entry for "general jurisprudence," defined as "[t]he
scholarly study of the law, legal theory, and legal systems generally").
151. Form, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1990) (defining "form" as "[e]stablished
behavior or procedure, usu[ally] according to custom or rule"); FormalLaw, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1990) (defining "formal law" as "[p]rocedural law").
152. See McKECHNIE, supra note 11, at 379-89; see also id at 107-20 (discussing the
legal formality of the document more generally).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 105-12.
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precepts implicit in the social contract that restrain the government: the
duty not to use power arbitrarily; the duty to act only through standing law;
the duty not to deprive anyone of life, liberty, or estate without the implied
consent of the majority; and the nondelegation of legislative authority.15 4
Coke's Institutes and Blackstone's Commentaries fall between these two
poles.
Blackstone tends to follow a formalistic model.
He uses
philosophic notions like personal liberty, but he defines these in legalistic,
rather than philosophic, terms. 155

The historical tension between legal philosophy and legal
formalism-the tension between identifying the ideal and finding a way to
embody it in law-produced periods in the fourteenth and the seventeenth
centuries when Parliament, commentators, and jurists substantially
reinterpreted the formal precepts of the Magna Carta's law of the land and
related clauses. 15 6 These reinterpretations adjusted the meaning of the
Magna Carta's norms, often under the guise of preserving or restoring an
ancient practice. 157 These reinterpretations led to the creation of several
new constitutional precepts founded loosely on Magna Carta text, including
several of the "subordinate rights"'158 that are now preserved in the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. A good illustration of a new constitutional
precept rooted in the Magna Carta tradition is the protected right to petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, formalized as a constitutional norm in the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.159 It derives remotely from the Magna Carta's
law of the land clause and a companion clause of the Magna Carta that

&

154. LOCKE, supra note 105, at 357-63.
155. See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 119-36; see also HOWARD, supra note 10,
at 99-101 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 106-07) (discussing another example of
Blackstone's legal formalism).
156. See, eg, FAITH THOMPSON, MAGNA CARTA: ITS ROLE IN THE MAKING OF THE
ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 1300-1629 (1972); Charles Donahue, Jr., Magna Carta in the
Fourteenth Century: From Law to Symbol?: Reflections on the "Six Statutes", 25 WM.
MARY BILL OF RTs. J. 591 (2016); Alexander Lock & Jonathan Sims, Invoking Magna
Carta:Locating Information Objects and Meaning in the 13th to 19th Centuries, 15 LEGAL
INFo. MGMT. 74 (2015); Jack L. Landau, Magna Carta Turns 800, 75 OR. ST. B. BULL. 17
(2015).
157. See, e.g, MCKECHNIE,supra note 11, at 384-86 (criticizing Coke's interpretation of
the law of the land clause, including accusing him of a "vicious method of assuming the
existence, in Magna Carta, of a warrant for every legal principle of his own day").
158. Shattuck, supra note 20, at 380.
159. Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, reprinted in 8 THE STATUTES AT LARGE, FROM THE
THIRTIETH YEAR OF THE REIGN OF KING GEORGE THE SECOND TO THE END OF THE SECOND

THIRD 432 (Danby Pickering ed., 1763); Amanda
L. Tyler, A "Second Magna Carta": The English Habeas Corpus Act and the Statutory
Origins of the HabeasPrivilege, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1949, 1953-56 (2016).
YEAR OF THE REIGN OF KING GEORGE THE
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promises, "To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny, or delay right or

justice."1 60
The birth of American constitutionalism in the late eighteenth century
represents a third period of reinterpretation and rapid development of these
constitutional norms, this time under the strong influence of Lockean social
contract theory. 16 1 During this period, the law of the land norm typically
stood alongside its progeny in constitutional texts of the day-progeny that
included the right to trial by jury, the right to a speedy trial, and the right to
habeas corpus relief.1 62 But the American law of the land and due process
clauses of the eighteenth century were more or less abstract provisions
when compared to these other, more specific formal precepts. Law of the
land and due process clauses were, in a sense, a bridge to the philosophic,
Lockean notion that every government is ordained to preserve certain
interests properly claimed by the members of the society, and a government
that fails to preserve these interests according to dictates of reason was no
longer operating legitimately. These interests-whether described as
"liberty" or as "life, liberty, or property" or using the traditional Magna
Carta language or some combination or adaptation of these-were to be
preserved by "the law of the land" or "due process"; that is, according to
established practices governed by the dictates of reason.
The law of the land and due process clauses thereby served as a
backdrop in continued discussions about how to regulate government
power so as to preserve natural rights and avoid arbitrary impositions under
color of law. 16 3 Put another way, these were more or less general
constitutional principles that might generate additional, particularized
constitutional norms. But interpreting the practical meaning of each state
or federal law of the land and due process clause was ultimately left to de
jure or de facto decision makers in the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches within the jurisdiction's constitutional framework of checks and
160. GREAT CHARTER OF LIBERTIES (1215), reprinted in SELECT DOCUMENTS OF ENGLISH
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 42, 47 (George Burton Adams & H. Morse Stephens eds., 1901).
161. Cf A.E. Dick Howard, Magna Carta'sAmerican Adventure, 94 N.C. L. REv. 1413,
1416-22 (2016) (discussing the evolution of the Magna Carta's principles in America
during the Revolutionary era); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2634-35 (2015)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing the meaning of "liberty" in America in the
Revolutionary era and its Lockean roots).
162. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, arts. XI-XII, XV; id pt. 2, ch. VI, art. VII; MD.
CONST. of 1776, decl. of rights XVII-XIX, XXI; N.H. CONST. pt. I, arts. XIV-XVI, XX; id
pt. II, oath and subscriptions, para. 11; N.C. CONST. of 1776, decl. of rights VII-X, XI-XIV;
PA. CONST. of 1776, decl. of rights IX, XI; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, arts. X, XIII; VA.
DECL. OF RIGHTS OF 1776,

§§

8, 11.

163. See infra Section VI.B; see also, e.g, HOwARD supra note 10, at 259, 270-74, 285344.
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balances. In practice, therefore, these diverse American clauses served as
similar and related (though hardly identical) repositories of imprecisely
defined metalegal principles concerning the appropriate limits of
government authority-principles that could be used to formulate specific
juridical rules or legislative or executive policies and practices to protect
liberty, broadly defined.
Put still another way, in the American texts, "due process," "law of
the land," and "life, liberty, and property" are almost Platonic formsabstract principles rather than concrete precepts-that must be formalized
into specific rules by those exercising political or judicial authority. These
provisions were, in fact, interpreted in a variety of ways and applied in
various contexts prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. They
were cited as pertaining to separation of government powers; a prohibition
on special legislation and bills of attainder; a right to compensation for
government deprivations of property; a right to notice and hearing; and the
right to trial by jury.164 Courts of different states, reviewing their state's
particular law of the land or due process clause, sometimes reached
different, even contradictory, interpretations as to whether and how the
norm applied in similar fact patterns.16 ' These differences can be attributed
either to formal difference between the states' constitutional language or to
differences in opinion about the meaning and application of the underlying
constitutional norm.
An attempt to formalize due process by strictly defining each term of
the constitutional texts, such as the term "liberty," or to treat the distinct
due process and law of the land clauses as one and the same, is inconsistent
with the overall history of this norm, even if that history is severed at the
adoption of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. That is not to say the
meaning of due process is entirely indeterminate. Beyond checks and
balances, the limiting principle lies in maintaining *a humble balance
between concrete legal formalism and abstract legal philosophy; between
legitimate government power and arbitrary government action; between
individual license and coercive or legal restraints. This balance is
liberty.16 6

164. See infra note 223.
165. See infra Section VI.B.
166. This is perhaps too realistic a view of the political and judicial processes to win
much support among conservative-minded originalists who desire to restrain the discretion
of judges in shaping constitutional law. The structure of the federal Constitution, however,
with separation of powers, checks and balances, and mechanisms for amendment, evidences
a recognition by the Framers that the preservation of liberty will, in fact, require political
and judicial struggle. Taking a formalistic approach to the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause removes the federal judiciary's power to check unforeseen and unprecedented
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The originalists' Due Process fallacy asserts that its narrow
interpretation of Due Process liberty is the one most consistent with the text
of the Constitution.' 6 7 Justice Thomas, Shattuck, and Warren advance a
few closely related arguments in support of this position.
First, as mentioned above, Shattuck and Justice Thomas argue that
reading "liberty" so broadly as to include "life" and "property" makes the
latter terms redundant in the Fifth Amendment.16 8 Shattuck describes this
as making the Clause absurd.169 As argued above, however, had the
framers of the Fifth Amendment used "liberty" alone, as Virginia,
Massachusetts, and Vermont did,' 7 0 the Due Process Clause could have
been read to protect only "liberty," narrowly defined. Using "life, liberty,
or property" balanced the competing goals of simplicity in the formulation,
broad protections, and elegance of language. Within this historical context,
this was the equivalent of protecting those rights preserved under the
Lockean social contract and the rights traditionally protected in the Magna
Carta law of the land clause.' 7
Second, Shattuck argues "liberty" cannot reasonably include rights
that were recent inventions, such as the freedom of religion. 7 2 This
argument is limited on its own terms. The argument does not extend to all
rights that may be included in "liberty," but only certain rights. It primarily
affects the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically the
issues of incorporation and substantive due process. This Article will not
resolve that debate, as its resolution does not implicate the validity of this
Article's central thesis. One should, of course, distinguish between the
prior historical development of certain "procedural" rights (like habeas
corpus protections) and "substantive" rights (like the freedom of religion).

executive and legislative actions, upsetting an important check in balancing the public good
and private rights.
167. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2632-33 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
See Shattuck, supra note 20, at 369, 375-76, 380-81; See Warren, supranote 20, at 440-41.
168. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2633 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhat usage avoids
rendering superfluous those protections for 'life' and 'property."'); Shattuck, supranote 20,
at 375 ("It is as unreasonable to say that 'liberty,' in this connection, includes all civil rights,
as it is to say that the term 'life' includes them, or that the term 'property' includes them. If
it did, it would include life and property, and the clause reading, 'no person shall be
deprived of life, all his rights, or property,' would be an absurdity on its face.").
169. Shattuck, supra note 20, at 375.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 65-68.
171. SeesupraPartV.
172. Shattuck, supra note 20, at 377-80.
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The former may be more or less implicit in "due process" or "law of the
land" rather than in "life, liberty, or property."'7 3
Third, Shattuck argues that reading "liberty" as including other
enumerated rights would make the Constitution unnecessarily duplicative
of these enumerated rights.1 74 He then separately argues, with Warren, that
if "liberty" includes other rights, these other rights can be deprived through
If the Fifth
due process. 175
These arguments are unpersuasive.
Amendment Due Process Clause provides only limited protection for a
broad category of civil rights, but other constitutional provisions provide
more absolute protection for specific civil rights, the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause can be read as subordinate to the other provisions.
Moreover, there are already substantial overlaps between the general
guarantee of Fifth Amendment Due Process and the other specific
protections afforded by, for instance, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and perhaps
even the Seventh and Eighth Amendments, as well as the habeas corpus
protections in Article One. 17 6 These overlaps are a product of the historical
development of the Magna Carta tradition and the tension between legal
formalism and legal philosophy, discussed in the preceding Part. 1 77 They
suggest the Due Process Clause was intended as a reservoir of as-yet
imprecisely defined principles limiting government action to preserve

liberty.
To these replies, we can add some arguments in favor of this Article's
interpretation of Due Process from this history and the text of the Fifth
Amendment itself. First, the lack of a personal pronoun in the original
federal Due Process Clause suggests "life, liberty, or property" was
intended as a single, general term of art in that particular text, not a list of
Personal pronouns designate ownership or
specific personal rights.
possession of something particular; a conspicuous lack of a personal
pronoun where there ought to be one may denote language being used in an
atypical, abstract manner. The Fifth Amendment provides, "No person
shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." 17 8 This does not say "his life, liberty, or property" or "his life, his
liberty, or his property." Blackstone's paraphrase of the Magna Carta law
of the land clause used personal pronouns, stating the Magna Carta
"protected every individual of the nation in the free enjoyment of his life,

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See supra text accompanying notes 36, 158-66.
Shattuck, supra note 20, at 380-81.
Id at 381; Warren, supranote 20, at 440-41.
See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (Habeas Corpus Clause); id amends. IV-VII.
See supra text accompanying notes 158-60.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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his liberty, and his property, unles [sic] declared to be forfeited by the
judgment of his peers or the law of the land." 17 9 Compare also the text of
the Fourth Amendment: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated."18 0 The contrast is even sharper in
Madison's proposed language. He used no personal pronoun in his
18
but proposed a prototype of the Fourth
proposed due process clauses
Amendment that read in relevant part: "The rights of the people to be
secured in their persons; their houses, their papers, and their other
property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated." 18 2 The omission of a personal pronoun is justified if one
understands "life, liberty, or property" to be a unified term of art borrowed
from Lockean social contract theory that signifies, abstractly, all personal
interests a government is rationally ordained to preserve and protect.
Second, while there was no recorded debate in Congress about the
Due Process Clause particularly, aspects of Madison's speech proposing
the amendment suggest he used "life, liberty, or property" in his proposed
due process clause to signify all those interests covered by the broad notion
of "liberty." Among his other proposed amendments, Madison suggested
first and foremost:
That there be prefixed to the constitution a declaration, that all power is
originally vested in, and consequently derived from, the people.
That government is instituted and ought to be exercisedfor the benefit of
the people; which consists in the enjoyment of ife and liberty, with the
right of acquiring and using property, and generally of pursuing and
obtaining happiness andsafety.

The parallel use of "life, liberty, or property" in Madison's proposed due
process clause suggests that due process serves a negative corollary of this
foundational precept: government power is to be exercised for the benefit
of the people; therefore, the government cannot deprive a person of life,
liberty, or property without due process. In both clauses, life, liberty, and

179. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 424 (emphasis
180. U.S. CONST. amend..IV (emphasis added).

added).

181. ANNALS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 91 ("No person shall
... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."). The only state
formulations that avoided the use of a personal pronoun were New York's constitutional
text and Connecticut's statutory text. See N.Y. CoNsT. of 1777, art. XIII; CONN. STAT. OF
1808, supranote 60.
182. ANNALS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 91, at 434-35
(emphasis added).
183. Id. at 433-34 (emphasis added).
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property collectively signify all rights a person may properly claim under
the social contract.
Later in his speech, Madison describes the various functions of his
proposed amendments:
In some instances [the proposed amendments] assert those rights which
are exercised by the people in forming and establishing a plan of
Government. In other instances, they specify those rights which are
retained when particular powers are given up to be exercised by the
Legislature. In other instances, they specifr positive rights, which may
seem to result from the nature of the compact. Trial by jury cannot be

considered as a natural right, but a right resulting from a social compact,
which regulates the action of the community, but is as essential to secure
the liberty of the people as any one of the pre-existent rights of nature. In

other instances, they lay down dogmatic maxims with respect to the
construction of the Government; declaring that the Legislative, Executive,
and Judicial branches, shall be kept separate and distinct.184
Given the historical and substantive connections between trial-by-jury and
Madison's proposed due process clause,18 1 Madison likely envisioned the
guarantee of due process as another "positive right" that is "essential to
secure the liberty of the people." As a "positive right," Madison intended
the clause to emphasize the government's obligation to provide due
process, not the formal preconditions qualifying a person for due process.
An emphasis on whether a person qualifies for due process by suffering a
deprivation of life, or of liberty, or of property would be misplaced.
Rather, "life, liberty, or property" was likely intended as a simple and
imprecise way to describe the breadth of the government's obligation to
provide due process, not precise, formal preconditions to qualify for due
process protections.
We might still question why Madison used the term "due process"
rather than "law of the land" in the text and what this indicates about the
meaning of the clause. While several more or less plausible-and not
always incompatible-theories have been proposed, 1 86 Madison likely
184. Id. at 437 (emphasis added).
185. McKECHNTE, supra note 11, at 340-43.
186. For instance, in Murray's Lessee, Justice Benjamin Curtis argues Article Ill,
Section 2 of the Constitution protects the right to jury trials in criminal cases and the Sixth
and Seventh Amendments further protect the right to jury trials in civil and criminal cases,
rendering the traditional reference to judgment of peers "superfluous and inappropriate" to
the Fifth Amendment's guarantees. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276-77 (1855). Justice Curtis then posits "law of the land,"
standing alone, could be ambiguous, suggesting that the Fifth Amendment, therefore,
employs the "due process" language proposed by Coke. Id. at 276. He does not explain
how "due process" is less ambiguous than "law of the land." Justice Curtis may have had in
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adopted the due process formulation, in place of the traditional law of the
land language, to signify that the range of protections afforded by the
clause was to be analogous to the protections provided by New York's
statutory bill of rights and the protections described in Coke's Institutes.
New York was the only state to adopt "due process" language, borrowing
from Coke's widely read Institutes."' New York's statutory due process
provisions also went beyond the other states' law of the land clauses.
Instead of merely requiring general compliance with the law of the land or
the right to judgment of peers, New York recognized specific ways the
government could abuse its citizens and expressly prohibited these, much

mind the potential conflict between using "law of the land" in the proposed amendment and
Article VI's language about the federal Constitution, treaties, and laws being the "supreme
Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. This potential conflict is often suggested as
motivating Madison's use of "due process." See, e.g., Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only
Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 445-46 (2010). While "Law of the
Land" in the Supremacy Clause relates to positive law, "law of the land" in the Magna Carta
context likely meant the common law in addition to (or instead of) positive law. Charles A.
Miller, The Forest of Due Process of Law: The American ConstitutionalTradition, in DUE
PROCESS: NoMos XVIII 3, 11 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977). Some
scholars emphasize the inherent risk of a positivist interpretation of "law of the land"
regardless of the use of that phrase in Article VI. See Gedicks, supra note 7, at 661-63.
This positivist interpretation, it is argued, could preclude judicial review of legislation that
effects deprivations directly or eliminates traditional procedural safeguards. Use of "due
process," by contrast, implies the norm regulates all branches of government. This includes
the right of judicial review of legislative enactments that effect deprivations directly or alter
the process by which deprivations may occur. Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W.
McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1679-80, 1703-17
(2012). At least one author has recently asserted that this clause "arguably effectuated a
general constitutional ban on legislative adjudications." Matthew R. Grothouse, Implicit in
the Concept of Ordered Liberty: How Obergefell v. Hodges Illuminates the Modern
Substantive Due Process Debate, 49 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1021, 1043 (2016). Others read
the proposal in its historical context as placing renewed emphasis on the traditional pretrial
safeguards described by Coke and preserved in New York's statutory bill of rights. Thomas
Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten Common-Law
WarrantlessArrest Standards and the OriginalUnderstanding of "Due Process of Law", 77
Miss. L.J. 1, 122-27, 146-48 (2007); Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Characterof Lawand-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era
Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 239, 408-37 (2002).
Some suggest that Madison borrowed directly from Coke or the English Bill of Rights, but
this addresses only Madison's supposed source and not Madison's motive. See Wayne
McCormack, Lochner, Liberty, Property, and Human Rights, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 432,
453 (2005); Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The
Supreme Court's Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 303, 309-21
(2001).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 83-90.
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as Coke did."' New York's statutory due process clauses required a proper
indictment or presentment contemporaneous with arrests and
imprisonment, presentment prior to an answer, the right to have the legal
process progress to a definite conclusion, and the right to judgment prior to
execution of the penalty. 9
By implicitly referencing New York's statutory due process clauses
and Coke's interpretation of the Magna Carta law of the land clause,1 90 the
Due Process Clause intimates its protections do not apply simply to the
initial deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Rather, different protections
Additionally, these
apply at different points of the legal process.
prohibitions fall on the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary alike.191
For instance, the legislature cannot authorize a prolonged criminal arrest
without indictment or presentment or some other initial charge (at least
without suspending the right of habeas corpus); the executive cannot
conduct one; and the judiciary cannot tolerate such an abuse. In contrast,
the law of the land language could be (and occasionally was) read as a
restriction on the executive and judiciary alone.1 92 True, Madison's due
process clause was not as specific as New York's statutory clauses.
Madison would have been cautious about which specific procedures he
would propose to be constitutionally protected in light of the difficulty of
amending the Constitution. The specifics, however, could be established
though political and judicial rulemaking, guided by the textual reference to
due process.
In summary, the textual arguments advanced by Justice Thomas in
support of the originalists' due process fallacy are weak, and his
interpretation of the historical evidence is suspect. The text of the Fifth
Amendment itself, lacking a personal pronoun in "life, liberty, or
property," distinguishes it from Blackstone's formulation in a notable way,
suggesting again that this phrase has a unified meaning. Madison's use of
life, liberty, and property in his proposed federal amendment was likely
derived from Locke, not Blackstone, as evidenced by the leading (albeit
rejected) proposed amendment. In discussing his proposed amendments,
he used "liberty" in a broad sense and likely intended "life, liberty, or
188. An Act Concerning the Rights of the Citizens of this State, supra note 63, at 28991.
18 9. Id.
190. See CoKE,supranote 11, at *45-*46.
191. See HOWARD, supra note 10, at 303-05.
192. See, e.g., State, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 28, 38-40 (1794). Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N.H. 53, 57
(1817) is also typically read in this light. See HOWARD, supra note 10, at 303-04, 304 n.12;
Williams, supra note 186, at 450. But see Chapman & McConnell, supra note 186, at 1724
n.233 (arguing Mayo should be read more narrowly).
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property" to have a similar, broad meaning. Finally, even the choice of
"due process" rather than "law of the land" suggests the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause does not lie in a formalistic
definition of its terms but continued political and judicial decision making
and through reference to historical practices.
VI. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF DUE PROCESS AND LAW OF THE LAND
CLAUSES

A.

Justice Thomas's Erroneous Summary ofPre-FourteenthAmendment
JudicialInterpretationsof "Liberty"

Finally, Justice Thomas's dissent in Obergefell argues, "State
decisions interpreting [law of the land and due process] provisions between
the founding and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment almost
uniformly construed the word 'liberty' to refer only to freedom from
There are several weaknesses, however, in his
physical restraint."1 93
argument and in the way he reads his sources.
Justice Thomas cites Warren's article in support of his assertion. 194
Warren acknowledges, however, "The term 'liberty' in the Due Process
Clause was construed by the State Courts in very few cases" within those
Warren studied,195 a concession Justice Thomas does not note. 1 96 Warren's
study also presupposes "liberty" in the Fifth Amendment is a distinct,
formalistic term, and he interprets the cases accordingly.1 97 For instance,
Warren favorably quotes this passage from the 1855 Vermont case Lincoln
v. Smith: "The liberty, spoken of in our bill of rights, is the liberty of the
person of every subject." 9 8 Warren describes this as "undoubtedly the
conception of the meaning of [liberty] held by Courts and lawyers prior to
1868."l99 In fact, the passage Warren cites in Lincoln continues by
construing "liberty" as including "life." 20 0 This is not entirely consistent

193. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2633 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
194. Id. (citing Warren, supra note 20). But cf Shattuck, supra note 20 (acknowledging
this interpretation of liberty has been repudiated by several courts).
195. Warren, supra note 20, at 443.
196. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2631-34 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
197. See Warren, supra note 20, at 440.
198. Id. at 443-44 (quoting Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328, 361 (1855)).
199. Id. at 443.
200. Lincoln, 27 Vt. at 361 (1855) ("The liberty, spoken of in our bill of rights, is the
liberty of the person of every subject; and the right to the enjoyment of life is personal to all;
and a proceeding affecting the life of a subject may well be termed a proceeding to deprive
him of his natural personal liberty; all this is involved.").
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with a narrow, formalistic interpretation of liberty. Moreover, Lincoln
represents the opinion of one court at one time in one American state
concerning one particular formulation of a law of the land clause. It
assumes too much to say this was "undoubtedly" the meaning of liberty
across the nation for the entire period for all law of the land and due
process clauses.
In the passage Justice Thomas cites from Warren's article, Warren
also restricts his study to those cases involving judicial review of the
legislative power in general. Warren excludes cases considering the
legitimacy of legislatively created judicial or quasi-judicial procedures.201
This method greatly narrows the scope of his study and eliminates at the
outset much of the potentially conflicting evidence. While the cases
Warren reviews might be construed as prototypes of substantive due
process, Warren identifies only seven cases in this study apart from Lincoln
related to the meaning of due process liberty.202 Four of these cases do not
actually construe the meaning of "liberty,"203 as Justice Thomas's citation
suggests.204 In fact, two do not even use the term "liberty" in the
opinion.20 5 One 1834 case that Warren discusses appears to construe
Maine's law of the land clause as applying to criminal cases alone.206 This
was a reasonable interpretation of the particular law of the land clause at
issue in the case, based on its context. In particular, like the early
constitutions of Virginia, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Massachusetts,
Maine's Constitution of 1820, as amended through 1834, had a law of the
land clause as part of the criminal procedures provisions, not in an

201. See Warren, supra note 20, at 441.
202. Id. at 444 nn.33-35. The cases are McCarthy v. Hinman, 35 Conn. 538 (1869);
Parker v. Kaughman, 34 Ga. 136 (1865); Devin v. Scott, 34 Ind. 67 (1870); Herman v. State,
8 Ind. 545 (1855); Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501 (1855); Nott's Case, 11 Me. 208 (1834);
Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238 (1863).
203. See Parker, 34 Ga. at 139-50 (determining the Confederate legislature had the
constitutional power to draft persons for non-armed service in the Confederate army);
Devin, 34 Ind. at 69-70 (deciding the legislature had the power to pass a statute that
deprived a habitual drunkard of "the right to enjoy, control, and dispose of his property, and
to make contracts"); Nott's Case, 11 Me. at 210-12 (deciding a poorhouse law was
constitutional); Kneedler, 45 Pa. at 248-49 (holding Congress's Article I powers do not
extend to the institution of a military draft).
204. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2633 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("State
decisions interpreting these provisions between the founding and the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment almost uniformly construed the word 'liberty' to refer only to
freedom from physical restraint." (citing Warren, supranote 20)).
205. Devin, 34 Ind. 67; Nott's Case, 11 Me. 208.
206. Nott's Case, 11 Me. at 211 (deciding a statute authorizing an indigent parent to be
committed to the poorhouse did not deprive him of due process, as it was not a penal act).
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independent clause. 207 Warren also acknowledges a Pennsylvania case that
invalidated the federal military draft law during the Civil War, but this was
not expressly on due process grounds as Warren suggests, 2 0 8 and Justice

Thomas does not address this case directly.20 9
Justice Thomas acknowledges that one case examined by Warren may
be cited as a counterexample to Justice Thomas's position, but he still tries
to synthesize the case with the originalists' Due Process fallacy. 2 10 This is
an 1868 case of the Indiana Supreme Court that held the state's liquor act
unconstitutional in a habeas corpus proceeding. 211 The court's conclusion
was, in fact, not based on a due process or law of the land clause; indeed,
Indiana did not have such a clause in its constitution.212 Rather, the act was
primarily challenged based on a clause opening the state's declaration of
rights that read:
[A]ll men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness; that all power is inherent in the people; and that all free
governments are, and of right ought to be, founded on their authority, and
instituted for their peace, safety, and well-being. For the advancement of
these ends, the people have, at all times, an indefeasible right to alter and
reform their government.2 13

The Indiana Supreme Court interpreted this guarantee to mean, "[W]e all
have some natural rights that have not been surrendered, and which
207. See ME. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a
right to be heard by himself and his counsel, or either, at his election; to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation, and have a copy thereof; to be confronted by the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; to have a
speedy, public, and impartial trial; and, except in trials by martial law or impeachment, by a
jury of the vicinity. He shall not be compelled to furnish or give evidence against himself,
nor be deprived of his life, liberty, property, or privileges, but by judgement of his peers, or
the law of the land.")
208. See Kneedler, 45 Pa. at 283 (holding Congress's Article I powers do not extend to
the institution of a military draft).
209. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2632-34 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 2633 ("Even one case that has been identified as a possible exception to that
view merely used broad language about liberty in the context of a habeas corpus
proceeding-a proceeding classically associated with obtaining freedom from physical
restraint." (citing Warren, supra note 20, at 444-45)).
211. Warren, supra note 20, at 444 (citing Herman v. State, 8 Ind. 545, 558-63 (1855));
see also id at 444 n.35 (citing Beebe v. Indiana, 6 Ind. 501 (1855)). Beebe had similar facts
and was issued only two months after Herman. The court copied portions of the Herman
opinion and added to it for the Beebe opinion. Beebe does not include Herman's broad
language about liberty.
212. IND. CONST.

213. IND. CONST. art. I,

§ 46; see Herman, 8 Ind. at 556-60; Beebe, 6 Ind. at 510-21.
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government cannot deprive us of, unless we shall first forfeit them by our
crimes; and to secure to us the enjoyment of these rights, is the great end
and aim of the constitution itself." 214 The American constitutions protect,
the court argued, a "great natural right of using our liberty in pursuing trade
and business for the acquisition of property, and of pursuing our happiness
in using it." 2 1 5 It argued with a flourish:

[T]he right of liberty and pursuing happiness secured by the constitution,
embraces the right, in each compos mentis individual, of selecting what he
will eat and drink, in short, his beverages, so far as he may be capable of
producing them, or they may be within his reach, and that the legislature
cannot take away that right by direct enactment. If the constitution does
not secure this right to the people, it secures nothing of value. If the people
are subject to be controlled by the legislature in the matter of their
beverages, so they are as to their articles of dress, and in their hours of
sleeping and waking. And if the people are incompetent to select their own
beverages, they are also incompetent to determine anything in relation to
their living, and should be placed at once in a state of pupilage to a set of
government sumptuary officers; eulogies upon the dignity of human nature
should cease; and the doctrine of the competency of the people for selfgovernment be declared a deluding rhetorical flourish. If the government
can prohibit any practice it pleases, it can prohibit the drinking of cold
water. Can it do that? If not, why not? 2 16

This logic might be best construed as a prototype of rational basis scrutiny,
though it does not quite fit that mold. Rather, it portrays-rightly or
wrongly-the legislative enactment as inappropriate because it would
allow, by implication, too much interference with natural rights.
While Warren treats this case as an aberration from the standard,
narrow judicial reading of "liberty" during the period,2 17 Justice Thomas
appears unwilling to brook any case that is contrary to his view. He
attempts to justify this "broad language about liberty" on the grounds that
the case was a habeas corpus proceeding, "a proceeding classically
associated with obtaining freedom from physical restraint." 2 18 This
argument is thoroughly flawed. Certainly, a person was challenging his
arrest, but the court opinion invalidated a formally valid state law because
214. Herman, 8 Ind. at 556-57; see also Beebe, 6 Ind. at 510 (employing substantially
the same language).

215. Herman, 8 Ind. at 557 (citing various provisions of the Indiana constitution); see
also Beebe, 6 Ind. at 512 ("[W]e find that the people have expressly reserved the right of
property, and its enjoyment, in forming their constitution, from the unlimited power of the
legislature.").
216. Herman, 8 Ind. at 558-59.
217. Warren, supranote 20, at 444-45.
218. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2633 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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it restrained citizens' natural liberty to select the beverages they wished to
drink. The fact that it was a habeas proceeding did not factor into this
analysis.2 19 Moreover, Justice Thomas's argument would suggest criminal
laws can be evaluated on substantive due process grounds if they authorize
physical restraint, or at least if they are challenged in a habeas corpus
proceeding. This is not consistent with Justice Thomas's absolute rejection
of substantive due process. 2 20 Notably, Justice Thomas does not directly
cite the case in question, perhaps to obscure the obvious fault in his
argument.2 21
In summary, the pre-Fourteenth Amendment case law Justice Thomas
references in this part of his dissent is not as favorable as he pretends.
Rather, as Warren acknowledges, most of the case law of the period relates
to property disputes, especially legislatively established judicial procedures
governing property disputes.2 22 Because the originalists' Due Process
fallacy separates "liberty" cases from "property" cases, it can build a legal
theory under the cloak of originalism without much support or opposition
in the case law.
B.

North Carolina'sEarly InterpretationofIts Law of the Land Clause

While it is fairly easy to show the faults in Justice Thomas's analysis
when he argues that liberty had a uniform, narrow meaning in preFourteenth Amendment case law, it is difficult to prove this Article's thesis
by reference to this case law. This Article, after all, tries to emphasize the
complexity of interpreting the various due process and law of the land
clauses, and anything less than a thorough review of the case law of the
period may yield a verdict of "not proved." 223 With that acknowledgment,
219. See Herman, 8 Ind. at 545-46.
220. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 811 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part) (describing substantive due process as a dangerous fiction).
221. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2633 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
222. Warren, supra note 20, at 442-43.
223. In fact, the constitutional norm was often cited, for instance, for the right to a trial,
according to the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, with such safeguards as a
complaint, a judge, and an opportunity to answer, before the imposition of a criminal or
quasi-criminal punishment or criminal disability. See, e.g., Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 376,
382 (1857); Fisher v. McGirr, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 1, 37 (1854); Attorney Gen. v. Bank of
Niagara, 1 Hopk. Ch. 354, 359 (N.Y. Ch. 1825); Huber v. Reily, 53 Pa. 112, 117-18 (1866);
Renney v. Mayfield, 5 Tenn. (4 Hayw.) 165, 167-68 (1817); Newcomb v. Smith, 2 Pin. 131,
135 (Wis. 1849); see also HOWARD supra note 10, at 326-31. It was occasionally construed
as guaranteeing the right to trial by jury-rather than merely the right to a judicial trial-in
criminal matters and occasionally in civil matters. See, e.g, Callahan v. State, 2 Stew. & P.
379, 382-83 (Ala. 1832); Tift v. Griffin, 5 Ga. 185, 189-90 (1848); Fetter v. Wilt, 46 Pa.
457, 460-61 (1864); Sevier v. Justices of Wash. Cty., 7 Tenn. (Peck) 334, 339 (1824);
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it is instructive to consider the case law of North Carolina related to its law
of the land clause. Of the states that adopted law of the land or due process
clauses between 1776 and 1788, North Carolina's case law best illustrates
the process of a state's judiciary using the state's law of the land clause to
develop and apply formal precepts to resolve disputes about the appropriate
limits of government powers.
North Carolina's law of the land clause, standing in an independent
section of the state's declaration of rights, read, "[N]o freeman ought to be
taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or
outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life,
liberty, or property, but by the law of the land." 224 The state had separate
constitutional provisions protecting the right to jury trial in criminal matters
and civil matters affecting property.2 25 It also protected several of the
specific criminal law procedures preserved in other state constitutions,
including the right of confrontation and the right against selfincrimination.22 6
These particulars likely influenced the judicial interpretation of North
Carolina's law of the land clause. For instance, in 1785, the North Carolina
legislature passed an act requiring courts to dismiss cases challenging the
state's confiscation and sale of real property during the Revolution.22 7

&

Tipton v. Harris, 7 Tenn. (Peck) 414, 419 (1824); Renney, 5 Tenn. at 168; see also
HOWARD, supra note 10, at 340-44. But cf Rhinehart v. Schuyler, 7 Ill. (2 Gilm.) 473, 51922 (1845) (contending this constitutional norm does not apply to civil proceedings, or has
very limited application in civil proceedings). Legislation affecting property, or affecting
court procedure related to property cases, was sometimes subject to particular constitutional
scrutiny under this norm. See, e.g., Hilliard v. Connelly, 7 Ga. 172, 180 (1849); Gaines v.
Buford, 31 Ky. (1 Dana) 481, 506-08 (1833); Morton v. Reeds, 6 Mo. 64, 73-75 (1839); see
also HOwARD, supra note 10, at 332-40. But see Kinney v. Beverley, 12 Va. (2 Hen. & M.)
318, 336 (1808) (stating the state law could declare land forfeiture for failure to pay taxes
without violating this norm). This norm was viewed by various courts as a prohibition on
special legislation, a separation-of-powers provision, and a prohibition on bills of attainder.
See, e.g., Wright v. Wright's Lessee, 2 Md. 429, 452-53 (1852); Little v. Frost, 3 Mass. (3
Tyng) 106, 117 (1807); State ex rel. Pittman v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570, 587 (1869); Trs. of
Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 1 N.H. 111, 129-30 (1817); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y.
378, 446-47 (1856); Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa. 86, 91 (1847); Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn.
(2 Yer.) 260, 270 (1829); see also HOWARD, supra note 10, at 316-26; Chapman
McConnell, supra note 186. One early court stated it stood simply for the proposition that
there "shall be no violation of the laws of the land." Minge v. Gilmour, 17 F. Cas. 440, 442
(C.C.D.N.C. 1798) (No. 9361). The norm was even cited as constitutional authorization for
the legislature to establish law permitting outlawry. Sherrod v. Davis, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.)
282, 285 (1796).
224. N.C. CONsT. of 1776, decl. of rights XII.
225. Id. decl. of rights IX, XIV.
226. Id. decl. of rights VII, VII.
227. Moore v. Bradley, 3 N.C. 174, 175, 2 Hayw. 142, 142-43 (1801).
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When this law was invoked in a case in 1786 and 1787, the trial court was
hesitant both to follow the act and to rule on the constitutional validity of
the act, encouraging the parties to try the matter by jury all the same.228
When pressed, however, the court reluctantly determined the act to be
unconstitutional. 229 While this decision was probably based on the state's
constitutional guarantee of the right to jury trial in matters affecting
property rather than the state's law of the land clause,230 the state supreme
court later relied on this decision in interpreting the state's law of the land
Notably, the state supreme court ruled in 1787 that the
clause. 231
underlying confiscation and sale of land was valid and consistent with the
law of the land guarantee.232 It did not address the lower court's refusal to
dismiss the suit. 23 3 By that time, the legislature had altered the act
compelling dismissal of such suits, receiving favorably the trial court's
decision not to comply with the law on constitutional grounds.234
This early case did not prevent the legislature from trying to shortcut
judicial procedures in other instances. A fascinating 1794 case reviews a
statute authorizing the state's attorney general to obtain judgments by ex
parte motions against receivers of public monies.235 When the attorney
general acted on this statutory authority, a judge refused to grant the
motion, citing the law of the land clause and the right to trial by jury.236
The attorney general returned later to the court and argued North Carolina's
law of the land clause did not prevent the legislature from authorizing this
procedure; it merely required the litigants and courts to follow whatever
lawful procedure existed at the time.237 The judge declined to grant the
motion again.2 3 8 The attorney general brought the motion and the
228. Bayard v. Singleton, 3 N.C. (1 Mart.) 42 (1787).
229. Id. at 44-45.
230. See N.C. CONST. of 1776, decl. of rights VIII.
231. Moore, 3 N.C. at 175-76, 2 Hayw. at 142-43.
232. Bayard, 3 N.C. at 45.
233. Id.
234. The Court in Moore provides this account:
In the year 1785, the Assembly passed an act taking from all persons the right of
suing for property sold by commissioners of confiscated estates, and of course the
rights of possession which such persons had: The Judges declared the act invalid,
and in 1786 the Assembly altered it. On that occasion the Legislature concurred
at last with the judiciary in the position, that the Legislature could not deprive any
man of his right to property, or of his right to sue for it.
Moore, 3 N.C. at 175-76, 2 Hayw. at 142-43.
235. State, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 28 (1794).
236. Id. at 29-30.
237. Id. at 3(-39.
23 8. Id. at 40.
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arguments before the court a third time, this time before a panel of two
different judges. 23 9 The judges, after taking the matter under advisement
for a few days, allowed the attorney general to proceed, accepting the view
that the law of the land clause did not restrain the legislature, but one judge
initially had "very considerable doubts."240
These cases illustrate the early questions about the legitimacy of
judicial review, especially pursuant to a constitutional clause that expressly
permitted deprivations by the "law of the land." In a subsequent case, the
North Carolina federal circuit court seemed deferential to the state's
legislature, construing the state's law of the land clause as requiring only
compliance with the law and refusing to void a legislative enactment on
principles of natural justice.24 1 The North Carolina Supreme Court,
however, was open to judicial review, even under the law of the land
clause, citing as precedent the 1786-1787 case, discussed above.24 2 The
supreme court resolved any lingering doubt in an 1805 case, University v.
Foy, going so far as to construe the law of the land clause as applying only
to the legislature.243 It held that the norm could not possibly apply to the
judicial or the executive branches because of their limited constitutional
authority.24 4 This affirmation of judicial review under the law of the land
clause represents the first major rule culled from the constitutional norm
after the Revolution.245 More specifically, University v. Foy also held that
the law of the land clause prohibited the legislature from vesting in a
person the property owned by another person.24 6
Twenty-eight years later, the North Carolina Supreme Court returned
to this constitutional precept to invalidate a law that replaced an appointed
court clerk with an elected court clerk.247 It ruled the appointed clerk's
office was his property, protected under the law of the land clause.248
While the office could be abolished and reestablished, the clerk could not
be removed while the office continued.249 In this case, the court reasoned:

239. Id.
240. Id
241. Minge v. Gilmour, 17 F. Cas. 440, 442-44 (C.C.D.N.C. 1798).
242. Moore v. Bradley, 3 N.C. 174, 175-76, 2 Hayw. 142, 142-43 (1801).
243. Trs. of Univ. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58 (1805).
244. Id. at 87-88.
245. HOWARD, supranote 10, at 303-05.
246. Foy, 5 N.C. at 87-88; see also, e.g, Barnes v. Barnes, 53 N.C. (8 Jones) 366, 372
(1861); Allen's Adm'r v. Peden, 4 N.C. (Taylor) 442, 442 (1817).
247. Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1 (1833), overruled by Mial v. Ellington 134
N.C. 131, 139 (1903).
248. Id at 30.
249. Id. at 17-21.

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol40/iss2/4

42

Bodoh: Liberty is Not Loco-Motion: Obergefell and the Originalists' Due

2018]

LIBERTY IS NOT LOCO-MOTION

523

[S]uch legislative acts, as profess in themselves directly to punish persons
or to deprive the citizen of his property, without trial before the judicial
tribunals, and a decision upon the matter of right, as determined by the laws
under which it vested, according to the course, mode and usages of the

common law as derived from our forefathers, are not effectually "laws of
the land," for those purposes. 250
It also construed property broadly as covering "whatever a person can
possess and enjoy by right; and in reference to the person, he who has that
right to the exclusion of others, is said to have the property." 251
Despite these developments, North Carolina did not reduce the general
law of the land precept to a specific rule, as the originalists' Due Process
fallacy would with respect to the meaning of "liberty." The North Carolina
Supreme Court occasionally read the state's law of the land clause at its
most general level as a limit on arbitrary government action. 25 2 In other
instances, state courts declined to follow legislative acts changing court
procedures when the change would deny a person the opportunity to
enforce a vested right.253 By 1812, the North Carolina Supreme Court
interpreted the constitutional norm as providing, "[N]o person should be
deprived of his property or rights without notice and an opportunity of
defending them." 2 54 On this interpretation, the court fashioned the very
specific rule that a plaintiff claiming title to land through a sheriffs sale
must produce the judgment supporting the sheriffs levy if the defendant
challenges the plaintiffs right of possession.2 55 At least one case suggested
the provision prohibited special acts of the legislature,25 6 much as Daniel
Webster argued before the United States Supreme Court in Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward,2 5 7 but this interpretation did not gain
significant traction in North Carolina.
The North Carolina courts also formulated various exceptions to
specific rules they articulated. For instance, the state's supreme court
250. Id. at 16; see also Houston v. Bogle, 32 N.C. (10 Ired.) 496, 504-05 (1849).
251. Hoke, 15 N.C. at 17.
252. See State v. Glen, 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 321, 331 (1859); Raleigh & Gaston R.R. v.
Davis, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 451, 460-61 (1837); Foy, 5 N.C. at 89.
253. E.g., Barnes v. Barnes, 53 N.C. (8 Jones) 366, 372 (1861).
254. Hamilton v. Adams, 6 N.9. (2 Mur.) 161, 162 (1812); see also Walton v. Sugg, 61
N.C. (Phil.) 98, 101 (1867); In re Ambrose, 61 N.C. (Phil.) 91, 93 (1867); Etheridge v.
Corprew's Ex'rs, 48 N.C. (3 Jones) 14, 16 (1855); Otey v. Rogers, 26 N.C. (4 Ired.) 534,
536-37 (1844); Irby v. Wilson, 21 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bet. Eq.) 568, 576 (1837); Redmond v.
Collins, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 430, 445 (1834); Bledsoe v. Wilson, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 314, 316
(1830); Delacy v. Meuse River Navigation Co., 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 274, 278 (1821).
255. Hamilton, 6 N.C. at 162.
256. Shaw v. Kennedy, 4 N.C. 591, 592, 1 Taylor 158, 159 (1817).
257. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
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authorized summary proceedings against sheriffs holding public monies, 258
as well as summary judicial procedures if a jury could be requested on a de
novo appeal. 259 The courts likewise tolerated the imposition of tax
penalties without trial by jury.26 0 The courts also remained deferential to
the legislature on many other matters affecting judicial procedure. For
instance, in 1801, the state supreme court enforced a law requiring a writ of
restitution to issue against a person convicted of taking property unlawfully
from another-even when the property subject to the writ purportedly
belonged to the convict. 26 1

Notably, unlike some other states, 262 North Carolina was reluctant to
understand the law of the land clause as requiring a jury trial in eminent
domain proceedings. The issue was addressed in an 1837 case.263 By that
time, North Carolina had established a statute authorizing eminent domain
with a committee of freeholders determining the fair value of the
property.264 The court affirmed this procedure.265 It expressed reluctance
to act on supposed precepts of natural law, looking instead for words in the
constitutional text on which to judge legislative acts. 26 6 It wrote of the law
of the land clause:
Under the guaranty of this article, it has been held, and in our opinion
properly held, that private property is protected from the arbitrary power of
transferring it from one person to another. We doubt not that it is also
protected from the power of despotic resumption, upon a legislative
declaration of forfeiture, or merely to deprive the owner of it, or to enrich
the treasury, unless as a pecuniary contribution by way of tax. Such acts
have no foundation in any of the reasons on which depends the power in
virtue of the right of eminent domain, to take private property for the public
use, and they could not be sustained by the offer of the fullest
compensation. Though not so obvious, it may also be true that the clause
under consideration is restrictive of the right of the public to the use of
258. Oats v. Darden, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 500 (1810).
259. Keddie v. Moore, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 41 (1811).
260. Cowles v. Brittain, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 204 (1822).
261. State v. Butler, 1 N.C. 501, 1 Cam. & Nor. 331 (1801).
262. See, e.g, Inhabitants of Gloucester v. Cty. Comm'rs, 44 Mass. (3 Met.) 375, 377
(1841); Vanhome's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795). Compare
Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38 (1796) (dividing evenly on whether
compensation had to be provided in eminent domain proceedings), with Gardner v. Trs. of
Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) (declaring an act unconstitutional for failing to
compensate landowners affected by waters being diverted for public use).
263. Raleigh & Gaston R.R. v. Davis, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 451 (1837).
264. Id. at 452-53.
265. Id. at 466.
266. Id. at 459-60.

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol40/iss2/4

44

Bodoh: Liberty is Not Loco-Motion: Obergefell and the Originalists' Due

2018]

LIBERTY IS NOT LocO-MOTION

525

private property, and impliedly forbids it, without compensation. But it is a
point on which the Court is not disposed, nor at liberty, to give a positive
opinion on this occasion.267
While the court assumed without deciding that the property owner had a
right to compensation for the taking, 268 the court determined this did not
implicate the constitutional right to trial by jury on property issues. 26 9
reasoned the compensation was not a condition precedent to the taking,27 0
and therefore the amount of compensation was only an inquest into
damages.2 7 1 It read "trial by jury" as a term of art that excludes cases
without a dispute of fact, and it considered an inquest into damages as not
involving a dispute of fact. 27 2
There were cases in which the North Carolina Supreme Court took a
more formalistic approach to the clause, but typically this was only in dicta.
For instance, in University v. Foy, discussed above, the court construed
The court was
"liberty" to mean specifically "personal liberty., 2 73
responding to arguments that corporations were not within the protections
of the clause. The court rejected this argument, pointing to the clause's
reference to both "liberty" and "liberties." 274 It argued the former related to
the personal liberty of individuals, while the latter related to the legal
privileges and rights of corporations.2 75 Notably, it did not confine
personal liberty to freedom from physical restraint.276 The rare cases in
which the court construed the terms of the clause formalistically in its
holdings often reached troubling results, such as when a criminal defendant
was barred from claiming double jeopardy because the court ruled the first
conviction was obtained through a proceeding that was unconstitutional
under the law of the land clause, even though the initial proceeding was
expressly authorized by a state law. 2 7 7
North Carolina's pre-Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence related to
its law of the land clause illustrates an important aspect of this Article's

267. Id. at 460-61.
268. Id at 459. But cf State v. Glen, 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 321, 331 (1859) (stating Raleigh
& Gaston RR. "strongly intimated" the right to compensation "may be implied" from the
law of the land clause).
269. Raleigh & Gaston R.R., 19 N.C. at 464-66.
270. Id at 461-43.
271. Id at 464-66.
272. Id at 466.
273. Trs. of Univ. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58, 87 (1805).
274. Id at 87-88.
275. Id.
276. See id
277. State v. Moss, 47 N.C. (2 Jones) 66, 69-70 (1854).
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thesis. Specifically, as a matter of practice, North Carolina treated its
clause as embodying an imperfectly formulated norm that restrained
arbitrary infringements on broad categories of protected interests-a norm
to be formalized through judicial rule-making. While many of these North
Carolina cases relate to the court procedures affecting property interestS2 78
or legislative transfers of property,279 they reflect more generally the
diligent effort of the judiciary to use the law of the land clause to balance
personal rights and legislative or executive prerogatives by devising
practical, enforceable rules in the preservation of liberty, broadly
understood.
VII. TOWARD A BETTER ORIGINALIST INTERPRETATION OF FIFTH
AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS

The originalists' Due Process fallacy of interpreting "liberty" to mean
only freedom from physical restraint oversimplifies the history of due
process in an effort to undermine the doctrine of substantive due process, if
not also the doctrine of incorporation. 2 8 0 This interpretation, however, is
not good history or decent originalism. There was no single, accepted
meaning of law of the land and due process clauses in late-eighteenthcentury America. There were many variations of these clauses, and the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause was an original formulation. The
history, text, and early interpretations of these clauses suggest they
embodied imprecisely formulated norms restraining government action in
the interests of preserving liberty, broadly understood as freedom from
arbitrary government action.
The earliest Supreme Court case construing the law of the land norm
recognized the provision's general role in restraining arbitrary
government. 281 Addressing Maryland's law of the land clause, which
arguably applied in the District of Columbia at the time by virtue of a
federal law,282 the Court wrote:
As to the words from Magna Charta, incorporated into the constitution of
Maryland, after volumes spoken and written with a view to their
278. See, e.g, State, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 28 (1794); Bayard v. Singleton, 3 N.C. (1 Mart.)
42 (1787).
279. Barnes v. Barnes, 53 N.C. (8 Jones) 366, 372 (1861); Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C.
(4 Dev.) 1 (1833), overruled by Mial v. Ellington 134 N.C. 131, 139 (1903); Foy, 5 N.C. 58
(1805).
280. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2632-34 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
281. Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 240-43 (1819).
282. Id at 240-43.
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exposition, the good sense of mankind has at length settled down to this:
that they were intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise
of the powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of
private rights and distributive justice.283
This, however, is hardly a practical rule by which to judge a case.
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. 28 4 and Hurtado
v. California285 developed rules that resolved some of the procedural due
process cases through reference to historical practices, and these precedents
seem fairly well-justified on originalism grounds, insofar as they go. 2 86
Hurtado certainly supports the thesis of this Article, namely, that the Due
Process Clause is a repository of principles from which to derive specific
rules restraining arbitrary government rather than a rule itself to be read
formalistically. 28 7 This line of cases does not resolve all due process issues,
though, especially when legislation departs from historically accepted
practices.2 88 Some of the later rules in this line of cases may be criticized
on originalism and other grounds, as Justice Scalia did in Pacific Mutual
289
Life Insurancev. Haslip.
While this Article argues the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
cannot be wholly reduced to formalistic rules, one can identify factors
based on this historical record that an originalist could use as loose
guidelines in evaluating whether a government action complies with due
process norms.
First, the pre-ratification history indicates Due Process and its
predecessors most clearly were meant to regulate procedural matters that

283. Id at 244.
284. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,
276-82 (1856).
285. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 519 (1884).
286. See also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 24-34 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (summarizing these rules).
287. As Justice Scalia noted:
Hurtado, then, clarified the proper role of history in a due process analysis: If
the government chooses to follow a historically approved procedure, it necessarily
provides due process, but if it chooses to depart from historical practice, it does
not necessarily deny due process. The remaining business, of course, was to
develop a test for determining when a departure from historical practice denies
due process. Hurtado provided scant guidance. It merely suggested that due
process could be assessed in such cases by reference to "those fundamental
principles of liberty andjustice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions."
Id at 31-32 (quoting Hurtado, 100 U.S. at 535 (emphasis added)).
288. Id.
289. Id at 33-34 (discussing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934)).
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may affect the imposition of criminal penalties or disabilities. 290 Thus,
originalists should be more willing to regulate, on due process grounds, (a)
procedural issues, (b) criminal matters, and (c) impositions of penalties.
They should be less inclined to impose due process constraints on
"substantive" matters, noncriminal matters, and matters not affecting the
imposition of penalties. That being said, some early American case law
interprets this norm as applying with particular force to noncriminal
property issues, and it may be fair to extend protections to those cases.29 1
Each of these, however, lies on a spectrum. Thus, Justice Thomas has
fairly argued that modem civil forfeiture may be unconstitutional on due
process grounds. 292 One, therefore, should not be overly formalistic in this
evaluation. For instance, while methods of collecting evidence in criminal
cases may be only remotely related to the trial procedure and the
imposition of criminal penalties, certain methods could be construed
practically as the imposition of a criminal penalty itself and subject to due
process constraints on that basis. 29 3

Second, history suggests certain procedural norms are fundamental to
due process, at least in criminal matters. These include the right to
reasonable notice and an opportunity for a hearing before an impartial
decision maker, the right to have legal process initiated contemporaneously
with or prior to the arrest or deprivation of property, the right to present
one's case to the decision maker, and the right to have the process move
without unreasonable delay to a definite conclusion. 294 There are, of
course, a few exceptions to these rules (such as the legislature's limited
power to suspend habeas corpus), and the protections plausibly could be
extended by analogy, at least in part, to noncriminal matters.
Third, historical pedigree for specific conduct or its close analogue
should generally favor a finding that the conduct does not violate Due
Process, especially if the historical usage continued for a long period prior
to and through the founding of this country. In this respect, Murray's

290. See supra Parts Il-VII.
291. See supra Part VII. From a historical perspective, this was probably due in part to
the "life, liberty, or property" language, in part to the cultural emphasis on property as an
instrument in securing liberty, and in part to the fact that the criminal implications of this
constitutional norm were already well developed, so the courts had less reason to resort to
the general law of the land or due process norms in criminal matters.
292. See, e.g, Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 847-50 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(denying certiorari).
293. Cf Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-174 (1952) (concluding the use of a
stomach pump to collect evidence is "too close to the rack and the screw to permit of
constitutional differentiation").
294. See supra notes 85-90, 184-89 and accompanying text.
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Lessee and its progeny generally reflect an acceptable development of the
due process norm, in an originalist framework.2 95
Fourth, the due process evaluation would differ based on whether the
act in question was an exercise of legislative, judicial, or executive power.
Legislative acts typically violate due process because of their content,
rather than the procedure by which they were enacted,2 96 but judicial acts
are the opposite. Meanwhile, executive acts may violate due process by
failing to follow an established procedure or because of the effects or
circumstances of the act. The evaluation must take into account the branch
of government whose action is under scrutiny, the breadth of their
appropriate discretionary powers on the subject within the constitutional
framework, and the relative need and utility of a formal process to restrain
potential abuses of that power.
Finally, there will be cases where judges have to break new ground in
applying the due process norm, and this is consistent with the history of the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and its predecessors. In those cases,
courts should take a broad look at both constitutional and practical issues.
Constitutional issues would include separation of powers, federalism, the
policy of stare decisis, and the preeminence of the legislature on policy
issues. Norms of fairness, the need for certainty, and reasonableness
certainly can play a role. Humble recognition of the meaning and
significance of liberty as freedom from arbitrary government should be a
guiding consideration.
As a closing comment, the originalists' Due Process fallacy seems
based on the implicit assumption that a narrow, formalistic interpretation of
Due Process is the best or only means of avoiding judicial abuses of power
under the cloak of these Clauses. This view, however, sacrifices the
implicit constitutional power of courts to act as an effective check on
legislative or executive actions that go too far in infringing liberty by
circumventing or short-circuiting established protocols or taking advantage
of new social or technological developments. A more authentic originalist
understanding of Due Process-with all of its historical uncertainty-better
allows courts to play their appropriate role in maintaining the balance
between private rights and the public's needs in the service of the common
good. This balance is the essence of liberty.

295. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 519 (1884); Murray's Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement. Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276-82 (1856); see also Pac.
Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 24, 30-33 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing
this line of cases).
296. Cf U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7 (establishing how a bill becomes a law).
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